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# ***JPRS Report***

## **West Europe**

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11 AUGUST 1987

## WEST EUROPE

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## GREENS DIVIDED OVER DEFENSE POLICY

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20/21 Jun 87 p 5

[Article by D.R.: "Dispute Among Greens Over Defense Policy"]

[Text] Angelika Beer, speaker of the Greens for defense policy, found fault with her own parliamentary caucus for their attitude toward disarmament. Frau Beer criticized that colleagues in Parliament, such as Waltraut Schoppe, had made wrong and questionable statements in the Bundestag, and that the Greens had introduced bills that do not correspond to the Party's majority views.

After a number of mishaps and confusing discussions among the Green parliamentary caucus on the disarmament proposals by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the reaction by the West, Mrs. Beer felt obliged to take a stand. She published documents demonstrating the confusion into which the Greens were plunged by the present phase of disarmament negotiations. It is two demands in particular which the "realpolitisch" wing of the Party and parliamentary caucus no longer wants to support: on the one hand, the demand for unilateral disarmament by NATO, and on the other hand, the renewed motion for repeal of the NATO two-track decision of autumn 1979. Mrs. Beer suggested that, in the future, the parliamentary caucus discuss disarmament questions more intensively in order to reach a uniform line.

The documentation and Mrs. Beer's explanations show that six draft resolutions by the Greens existed at the time of the disarmament policy debate on June 4 of this year at which Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl explained the position of the coalition on the double zero solution. One of the resolutions, drafted by Mrs. Beer, Petra Kelly and Gertrud Schilling, was then adopted by the caucus with 18 against 10 votes and introduced in Parliament. The caucus also decided that Mrs. Beer should be the main speaker, while member of parliament Alfred Mechtersheimer should be the second speaker. Since Mrs. Beer was still working on her speech and was not present in the plenary hall when called upon, Mechtersheimer had to step in. During the ensuing vote, four of the Green members present voted for the SPD motion, four voted against, and 18 abstained. During the roll-call vote on the Greens' motion, six members of parliament from their own ranks abstained, among them Mechtersheimer, Otto Schily and Mrs. Schoppe. Mechtersheimer commented that he had not wanted to join in the

"political nonsense" contained in the demand for repeal of the NATO two-track decision.

An even greater disarray had occurred on May 7 during the first disarmament debate of this legislative term. At that time, also, motions by the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, the SPD, and the Greens were before the Bundestag. Since the Greens had a total falling out amongst themselves prior to their motion, Hubert Kleiner, their parliamentary executive secretary, tried a compromise and made a motion on his own to send the resolution to the foreign policy committee. Subsequently, 23 Green members of parliament voted for the SPD motion, seven voted against, and nine abstained.

This procedure in turn outraged the delegates of the Duisburg Party Congress as well as the members of the Green executive committee. The Duisburg Party Congress adopted a resolution demanding that the parliamentary caucus return to the old peace-policy positions of the Greens. However, this resolution was subsequently attacked. After many protests by state party associations, the parliamentary executive committee then demanded of the parliamentary caucus that they withdraw the motion. The caucus did not comply with this demand since they could not get a majority. Mrs. Beer said on Friday that the foreign policy committee was now presented with a motion by the Greens which "is completely out of step with the programmatic statements by the Greens."

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## PROSPECTS FOR CDU/FDP COALITION IN MAINZ CONSIDERED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Jun 87 p 14

[Article by Eckhart Kauntz: "A New Feeling of Government in Mainz"]

[Text] The new coalition government in Mainz has established itself. After 16 years of sole CDU rule, the alliance with the FDP is for Christian Democratic Minister President Bernhard Vogel a return to normalcy and to a tradition which existed between 1951 and 1971. For the Free Democrats of Economics Minister Bruederle, it is a functional alliance desired by the voter, but limited to 4 years. The different stress is not accidental--on the one side, the attempt to imbue the collaboration as the renewal of an interrupted practice with a binding effect transcending far beyond the present legislative term; on the other side, ostentatious matter-of-factness and emphasis on time limitation. Vogel wants to tie the FDP to himself since "the voter" in Rhineland-Palatinate at present appears not to want absolute majority of one party. Bruederle wants to keep all options open for his Party in case the SPD should get far beyond the 40-percent hurdle in future state parliamentary elections and the present CDU slump has not yet reached its end. The new FDP justice minister Caesar has already stated in all innocence that he could also imagine himself as justice minister in a government led by the SPD. And FDP state chief Bruederle indicates that there is no love match in Mainz.

In Rhineland-Palatinate, where some rural and middle-class economic and ideological structures have been preserved, where ties to the church have kept many Catholic voters with the CDU, where people are formed more by clubs and the parental home than in urban centers, the "last minute swing," the voter decision shortly before the walk to the ballot box, led to the surprise on voting day, May 17. The loss of over 3 percentage points which is supposed to have occurred between the Thursday before election day and election Sunday (if one believes coinciding poll results by various institutes), poses a puzzle. The turning away of disappointed farmers and vintners from the CDU is not sufficient justification. Probably it is simply this: the voter had become unpredictable.

Vogel survived the turbulences in his party quite well. True, the composition of the new government shows a personnel preponderance of the southern party district of Palatinate-Rhine Hesse at the expense of Coblenz, for which



Coblenz' district chairman and interior minister Geil reaped internal party criticism. But the inclusion of two FDP ministers and three FDP state secretaries in the government is the price for losing the absolute majority.

Vogel can be satisfied with tying his potential rival, Wilhelm, into his cabinet as minister for environmental affairs. Wilhelm led the parliamentary caucus for 6 years; it gained a measure of self-confidence at times uncomfortable for the minister president. The new parliamentary caucus under its chairman, 55-year-old Emil Keller, will give the government more room for action. Vogel's introduction of the government program to the caucus showed first signs of this. Formerly, it had its own position ready on such occasions. This time, there was no critical discussion.

The threatening loss of the caucus' role as a critical and cajoling corrective of government performance is not the only thing worrying some CDU members. With the departure of environmental minister Toepfer for Bonn, the last cabinet member has left who gave impulses beyond the state borders and reminded of times when the reputation of the Rhineland-Palatinate state government was founded as one of the outstanding state cabinets. Vogel himself often regretted that ministers were taken from him. One must recall Mrs. Laurien, now senator in Berlin; Gaddum, now a director of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt; Geissler, now general secretary of the CDU in Bonn. These three, like Toepfer, had been brought to Mainz by Kohl or his successor, Vogel; their politics had not always been comfortable, but they had added lustre to the state CDU which--in addition to influence from Bonn--had helped it to gain the absolute majority four times in a row, without interruption.

The discussion has started about the condition of the CDU in Rhineland-Palatinate. Vogel himself sees the loss of 6.8 percentage points compared to the 1983 state parliamentary elections as more than just an accident, but also not as a cause for wild activism. Communal elections will be held in Rhineland-Palatinate in 2 years. Their result will have a bearing on whether the Free Democrats will accept Minister President Vogel even beyond the present legislative term. They cannot be desirous of a weakening partner.

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## SLOW RATE OF POLITICAL CHANGE SEEN IN RHEINLAND-PFALZ

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 15 Jun 87 p 6

[Article by Klaus Brill: "Liberal Pressure for Reform in the Land of the 'Patriarchs'"]

[Text] There were charged moments in these Rhineland-Palatinate coalition negotiations. Bernhard Vogel would have liked to get up and leave. As he puts it, "there were very hard encounters," and painful insights were gained. If a compromise was reached nonetheless, it was primarily because there was a compelling need for agreement. No other possibility of cooperation is realistic for the CDU and the FDP in the present political power scene in the Rhineland-Palatinate. Overall, it went rather fast, as a glance at Hamburg indicates. That the coalition was forged, with many sparks flying, 4 weeks after the state parliamentary elections may, however, have also been influenced a bit by the fact that the SPD applied its own bellows by calling for a state parliamentary meeting for this Monday.

To a limited degree, the Social Democrats will continue to have a finger in the pie since the constitutional changes planned by the CDU and FDP--extending the legislative term, reapportioning the election districts, new ways of appointing county administrators--require a two-thirds majority. It will be particularly tricky in the project of extending the state parliamentary term from 4 to 5 years, i.e., to do the same as the Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia. There is no convincing reason for this procedure except that those in power wish to be disturbed less often by their sovereign, the people. Vogel's argument, that the populace is sated when there are several elections in one year (both federal and state) and when possible failures in forming a government lead to new elections, is not at all convincing. It is unconvincing on the basis of fundamental considerations of democratic principles, and also because, especially in Rhineland-Palatinate, a state parliament has never been dissolved prematurely. Furthermore, 4 years ago, Vogel's CDU happily made use of the proximity in time of federal and state elections and even linked up the dates. Incidentally, election frustration is caused less by the frequency of elections rather than by displeasure with the parties' behavior.

The other electoral reforms planned by the new coalition are somewhat more justified. Giving more elbow room to small parties by introducing a second vote in state parliamentary elections and applying the Hare-Niemeyer procedure

in establishing the number of seats also gives more freedom of action to the voter, as does the proposed amendment to communal election rules (accumulating and splitting votes). No knowledgeable person will ignore the fact that the FDP primarily thought about itself, since it will profit by it (as will the Greens). This explains the resistance by the CDU. As Vogel himself says, it is a simple calculation: If during the last state parliamentary election the votes had been weighted according to Hare-Niemeyer instead of d'Hondt, the Christian Democrats would have two seats less, the FDP and the Greens would each have one more.

Politics is very simple, also with regard to the agreements about county administrators and data protection. In this case, the CDU had to suffer the loss of traditional privileges. It is truly unique that so far in Rhineland-Palatinate, county administrators have been appointed by the state government and only confirmed by the county council--a relic from Prussia, a deviation from the rules of modern parliamentary democracy. It is also a curious interpretation of data protection when, up to now, it was in the charge of a commission consisting of three state delegates (two from the CDU, one from the SPD), the director of the state parliament, and one state secretary from the state government, with the result that four CDU men, including a member of government, and one delegate from the opposition control the CDU government.

In other areas the CDU refused to give in. There will be no representative action, and no change in social policy. The agreements on the amendment of communal election rules are compromises; the FDP was unable to push through direct popular elections of mayors and county administrators. The fact that the Liberals do not get to fill the post of deputy minister president can be seen in the same light if one places much importance on questions of prestige. But the FDP is getting three state secretary posts where two are the norm in comparable cases. Their distribution brings about that the Liberals are now represented in four ministries at the leadership level.

The only surprise in personnel decisions is the appointment of Free Democrat Peter Caesar of Idar-Oberstein as minister of justice. He calls himself a lawyer "from passion," has been a member of the FDP executive committee for 4 years and hails from Oldenburg. He is the son of an Idar-Oberstein lawyer who moved north when the Birkenfeld region was still a part of Oldenburg (until 1937). Only a few people knew him in Mainz. The final inclusion of former CDU parliamentary caucus chief Wilhelm in the cabinet proves Vogel's forceful effectiveness which had sometimes been doubted. Wilhelm, who occasionally had danced out of line in order to establish himself as a presumptive candidate for a later succession to Vogel, must now prove himself in the most dangerous cabinet post, that of minister for environmental affairs.

Once again, women got the short end of the stick. Only one became minister, very much in the patriarchal tradition. In the infighting among the gentlemen of regional districts, still very prevalent in Rhineland-Palatinate, women had to be satisfied with a ladies' program.

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FRANCE

POLITICAL

# MARCHAIS' REPORT TO PCF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 13 Jun 87 pp 13-16

[Report by Georges Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party, to PCF National Conference]

[Excerpts] The 1,200 delegates to the PCF National Conference were welcomed by Jacqueline Fraysse-Cazalis, member of the Central Committee and senator for Hauts-de-Seine, on behalf of the Communists of that department.

Georges Marchais then stepped up to the white rostrum decorated with red hammer and sickle, and lined with geraniums and green plants. From the first moments of his speech, which was to last an hour and a half, he was interrupted by lengthy applause lauding the name Andre Lajoinie, proposed as a candidate by the Central Committee.

Other applause followed during the speech. In honor of Pierre-Andre Albertini, and for the presence on the rostrum of his father, delegate for Eure. Applause to approve the proposals of the secretary general concerning Le Pen, who has "no more determined opponents than the Communists."

There was also laughter. When Georges Marchais summoned the journalists to their pens and cameras to hear his response to the standard questions about the second round or second candidate; when he referred to the "smirking" Barre, and to Rocard and his media lessons. Finally, long applause marked the end of the speech, calling on Communists with their candidate to "open a new perspective for our people and France."

[Marchais report] Comrades, the agenda of this National Conference is as follows: "The Communist Party's campaign and the nomination of its candidate for the presidential election."

## Will Democratically Expressed by Communists

As the statutes of our party state, "The National Conference decides, on proposal of the Central Committee, the candidate for election of president of the Republic."

It is thus my duty--one which I perform with great joy--to submit the selection of the Central Committee for discussion by the National Conference:

we propose that the Communist candidate for the 1988 presidential election be Andre Lajoinie.

This proposal is not really a "scoop," as they say. In fact, the Central Committee announced it almost a month ago.

It did so on conclusion of a 3-day discussion during which each had the opportunity to propose the candidate of his choice and then to vote for that candidate. The members of the Central Committee unanimously--two did not participate in the vote--declared themselves in favor of Andre Lajoinie, considering that among them he was the one most qualified to publicize our innovative and unifying policy in this election.

As is known, the leadership of our party is not satisfied with performing this basic political action. In order that the decision we are going to take will be the product of the democratic will expressed by the Communists, it encouraged all comrades who wished to do so to express their feeling in regard to this proposal along with their possible suggestions, in their organizations or directly to the party leadership. That is what occurred. All Communists who wanted to give their opinion have done so. From the mail addressed to the Central Committee and the discussions of the cells and section committees it emerges that, beyond the expression of some disagreements and proposal of other candidates, the overwhelming majority of Communists, almost all the cells and section committees that expressed themselves on this issue, approve the candidacy of Andre Lajoinie.

Certainly, the decision is completely the responsibility of the National Conference. However, it is obvious that the profound agreement of Communists with Andre Lajoinie's candidacy, and the favorable current already evident outside our ranks, will have a strong influence in the choice we are going to make.

Candidacy of Andre Lajoinie: Trump the Party Needs

To tell the truth, this proposal appears to the party for what it is: the best possible.

In order to stimulate the high-level struggle that we must carry out, we should adopt as spokesman one of the foremost leaders of the party. Andre is one. As secretary of the Central Committee, his creative support to the implementation and development of our policy is important. He is particularly qualified to clarify, in face of the lies of the advocates of austerity and national abandonment, the issue that our party's policy offers to France.

And we must provide ourselves with a candidate in whom all the women and men, those whom this policy seeks to mobilize in action and the vote, can recognize themselves.

In proposing the candidacy of Andre Lajoinie, the Central Committee is convinced--and you will permit me to add this personal note: it is my profound conviction--that it is providing Communists with the trump they need to wage a vigorous campaign and thus achieve our set objective: restoring the hope and opening a new perspective for our people.

## France Is at the Crossroads

We emphasized to the Central Committee that France is at the crossroads.

Unemployment is reaching unprecedented levels. The precariousness of the living and working conditions is tending to become the norm. In our country, 8 million people are currently living on less than 50 francs a day; the difficulties are mounting for the great majority of the population; and, at the same time, less than 20 percent of households have 90 percent of the national wealth income, and continue to get richer. The figures are now known: in the past few years, profits have doubled, fortunes tripled, and the stock market has quadrupled and will soon have quintupled.

It is of little concern to the profiteers class that their policy is leading to a veritable social and national disaster.

The billionaires are now themselves climbing into the front line. For example, Francois Dalle, who accumulated a considerable fortune by exploiting the work of wage-earners in the French pharmaceutical industry, and who has subsequently hastened to put more than half of this--from 100 to 150 billion centimes--in America and Switzerland, has just submitted a report to Minister Seguin that he has dared to title "To Develop Employment." The indecency and inhumanity of the upper middle class, which is ruining the country, is exposed in this report.

### Dalle Report: Billionaires' Plan

Judge for yourself. The Dalle report proposes that "the official work schedule be increased to a significant degree," that is, to 45 or 48 hours paid at the rate of 40 hours. It proposes that the base wage be decreased by one-third, and that the rest depend on the profits of the enterprise achieved through eliminating jobs and speculation; and this infernal over-exploitation measure is already in effect in some enterprises.

What it proposes is purely and simply the shattering of the Labor Code, unlimited multiplication of temporary and part-time jobs to the detriment of normal employment. It proposes to reduce women to the rank of subordinate and underpaid wage-earners, and confined to partial, "little jobs." It proposes to establish a two-rate social insurance. It proposes to have wage-earners pay for their own training. And, for good measure, it calls for several tens of billions of additional tax advantages for the employers.

### React Much More Vigorously to Threats to Freedom

In this connection, I want to draw the attention of the National Conference to the seriousness and scope of the mechanism underway. The government and employers have begun by expanding the fines, penalties and harrassments of all kinds against the workers in struggle. They are now conducting all-out firings of CGT representatives, and among them, of course, many Communists.

We are thus in a serious situation. And we must frankly recognize it: our reaction is inadequate. One might even wonder whether there is not sometimes

a degree of resignation among us. We must react much more vigorously than we have done so far.

In truth, the leadership class is preparing and creating with each of its actions a considerable regression: an unbearable society of social selection and exclusion, cultural and political vassalization of France, worsened poverty of the Third World, and a terrifying accumulation of nuclear weapons on earth and in space.

#### Real Face of the Right

Such is the policy of the Chiracs, Barres, Leotards, Giscard and their associates. Rarely in comparison to today has this Right, always true to form, antipopular, antidemocratic and antinational, had so many resources to impose its will.

Not an action or a statement that does not exude the class hatred of Chirac and his people.

#### No Opponents of Le Pen More Resolute than the Communists

And then, there is Le Pen. Part and parcel of the Right, this repulsive and dangerous person incarnates, as we said to the Central Committee, "the Right taken to extreme." Le Pen is the most frenzied enemy of the workers and democrats; and this is to say that there is no opponent of Le Pen more resolute than the Communist Party."

We are determined to answer with the most extreme vigor, in the interest of democracy itself, those who, out of anticommunist fanaticism, are trying to use Le Pen in service of their sinister cause. After others, Chirac recently dishonored himself by daring to liken the National Front to our party. We do not tolerate and will not tolerate this insult, this ignominy. Above all, not from a man like Chirac.

First of all, it is not in company with the Communist Party that Le Pen's men currently lead dozens of national communities: it is with the friends of Chirac, the RPR and the UDF. It is not in favor of the Communist Party that Le Pen votes systematically in the National Assembly, it is in favor of Chirac's RPR-UDF government: more than 400 times in a year. One does not find cousin and buddy relationships with Le Pen among the Communists, but among Chirac and his people.

And moreover, Chirac should know, at this time when the Barbie trial is underway, that between what Le Pen represents and ourselves there is not only just opposition of ideas: there is blood. The blood of Communist members who were victims of the prewar fascist leagues; that of Communist resistance members who were victims of collaborators and the militia; and that of anticolonialist Communists who were victims of the OAS. In each period of our history, past, yesterday and today, when the extreme Right has raised its head again, it is always the Communists whom it finds drawn up on its path, and it is always the Communists whom it has struck first. One loses the right to claim Gaullism when one forgets it.

All the French political parties, without exception, have this blood of Communists on their hands. Chirac's party has the blood of the victims of Charonne, who also died to protect democracy. And that we will not let anyone forget. In 1988, there will be no vote that is more anti-Le Pen, anti-Chirac, and more anti-Barre than the vote in favor of the Communist candidate.

No Serious Differences Today or Tomorrow Between Right and PS

But does this rightist policy find supporters only on the Right? We well know that that is not the case.

We explained to the Central Committee that we do not say, referring to the PS and the Right: "Much of a muchness." However, it is a fact, as we have shown by many supporting examples, that "on all the essential issues, the class decisions are now shared by the leaders of the PS, the RPR, and the UDF. The existing separation between the policy of capital and the new policy no longer passes between Right and Left, but within the Left, between the PS and the Communist Party."

For in what conditions is this rightist policy of unprecedented brutality being applied? Under the cohabitation of the Socialist president of the Republic and the rightist prime minister. In an agreement "without nuance," in Chirac's expression, among him, his majority RPR-UDF, and the president. Naturally, now and then there are some skirmishes. But do these tempests in a teapot harm the cohabitation? Not at all. Do they demonstrate serious differences on the policy followed? Absolutely not.

In regard to economic and social affairs, all defend the wage austerity, the cutting back of social expenditures, making jobs nonpermanent and flexible, and financial parasitism.

And how do they plan to apply this catastrophic policy tomorrow? Together. Perhaps not under the same form of cohabitation as today. Depending on the candidate who is elected--and we are naturally in no way indifferent to who that is--the type of combination and coalition may change. However, whoever the president, the cooperation in power between the rightist leaders and the Socialist leaders will always be assured. This or that Socialist personality is thus stating readiness to serve as the prime minister of a Chirac or a Barre, while the names of Giscard d'Estaing or Leotard are being proposed more and more insistently to rule with Mitterrand if he is reelected.

This, beyond the personal rivalries, is the real trap being held out to French men and women in the 1988 election: to arrange that, whomever is elected president, the future of our country will be locked onto the path of worsening the same rightist policy, of the headlong regression in all fields of the life of the people and the country that I have described.

Communist Vote: To Express Dissatisfaction and Maintain Struggles

That is what we are saying "no" to! The Communist candidate will be the candidate of all men and women who are dissatisfied with their fate and who want to make it known loud and strong.



Indeed, what other way do they have to show their dissatisfaction in this election than voting Communist? What other means to maintain the struggles for their demands other than proclaiming their support for the candidate of the only political force that has never ceased to call for their advancement and never ceased to support them?

#### Only Vote of Real Opposition Anger Against Current Policy

Abstain? That would be to leave the path open to those responsible for all the injustices.

Vote for Mitterrand or Rocard against Chirac and Barre, or vote for Chirac or Barre against Mitterrand and Rocard? Yet, as I have shown, it is the same policy that they have implemented or will implement, and they all agree on worsening it further.

Vote for Le Pen? I have also shown: beneath his swashbuckler airs, this demagogic racist billionaire flattens like a carpet in face of the slightest desire of the employers. Voting Le Pen means saying to Chirac and Barre: "You are too soft; further step up the austerity, unemployment, and inequalities; give even more privileges and wealth to those who already have so much!"

In 1988, as has always been the case, there will only be one vote of anger, one vote of struggle, one vote of real opposition to the current policy, that will be the Communist vote. When one wants to really condemn the Right, the extreme Right and their policy, one must do it straight out. And everyone knows that the Communist vote is the vote that does them the most damage, the one that they will never be able to regain, whatever happens.

#### Party Program: Justice, Freedom, Peace

Moreover, the Communist vote will not only be a vote against. It will also be a vote for: for another policy; for a new union in favor of a real change; for opening an alternative, an outcome, a new prospect for our people.

We have thus proposed establishing our program around three major themes: justice, freedom and peace. In effect, each of them is a field of direct confrontation between the forces of capital and the popular forces. In other words, it is how the political forces respond to these three fundamentals that they locate themselves in one camp or another.

In respect to purchasing power, employment, Social Security, profits, schools, freedoms, national sovereignty, peace, as well as for all the other problems facing our people, the conclusion will in each case be the same. Vote for the Communist candidate; that will mean voting for the other policy that France needs. That will mean helping to make this real change take shape.

#### Our Objective: To Make 1988 Positive Date for the Change

As I have said: a trap has been set for French women and men on the occasion of this election of 1988. But it is not true that their plan has no flaw. It is not true that the result of this election, and what will follow, are already laid out. On the contrary: nothing is determined! There is an

opening, there is an effective means of influencing the result and its consequences in the direction of the popular and national interests: it will depend on the number of Communist votes.

If millions and millions of French women and men indeed affirm, by that means: "No, we do not want more of the current policy; no, we do not want more of the Right and even less the extreme Right; yes, we do want unity for another policy," this demand will affect the direction of this election, and it will be decisive in all that will follow. This, clearly stated, is the objective of the Communist candidate and of our party: to make 1988 a positive date for action, unity, development of the popular movement, and a positive date for the change that is more necessary than ever.

Thus, for all the forces of the consensus, the Communist campaign will be the main obstacle, the one that will have to be beaten. No doubt, we will not be spared any blow.

#### Two Titillating Subjects for Journalist Politicians

One can predict some of them. An example is the use that will be made of the basically undemocratic nature of the presidential election. The same is true for the role that they want the major information media to continue playing. It is apparent that censorship and systematic distortion of our positions will increase. As I said to the Central Committee, "We can expect anything in the effort to exclude our new policy from the debate. Really anything, I think."

We already have some advance signs--for we are really only at the very beginning--with two themes obviously in favor among journalist politicians. If a Communist leader is interviewed by one of these, he knows that he will invariably have to answer two questions. They may ask him 5, 10, 20 questions; he may talk for 10 minutes, 20 minutes or an hour; it will always be the 30 seconds of replies to these two questions that will be reported.

Thus, the first question: "What will you do if there is a second Communist candidate?" Second question: "What will you do in the second round?"

Then, plug in the cameras, turn on the microphones, and get pens ready, because I am going to answer these two famous questions!

#### "What Will You Do If There Is a Second Communist Candidate?"

In regard to the first question, I will be brief. The National Conference has assembled, today and tomorrow, to select the Communist candidate for the presidential election. There is a proposal by the Central Committee--Andre Lajoinie. As I have demonstrated, this proposal has elicited general approval and satisfaction within our party. However, it is the National Conference that will decide. It is sovereign. If someone thinks of one or more other names, let them tell the Conference. During these 2 days the discussion is totally free, as in all the other organizations of our party. And tomorrow we will vote.

## "What Will You Do in the Second Round"

The second question: the second round.

I answer: the import for our people and our country of the 1988 election, and the result of that election itself, will depend on the first round. Trying to distract the attention of the French from this round in the election that will count, that will be determining, means seeking to prevent them from effectively participating in this vote.

In fact, what is the main issue posed in this election? It is this: Is there or is there not an alternative? Is only one policy possible, or two? Are we obliged to continue on the same path, or can we do something different, and thereby genuinely improve the life of the workers and the country? Basically, that is the only question that interests people.

Yet, when will it be posed? In the first round. When the Communist candidate will be in the arena. For as I have shown, he alone will proceed in this campaign with proposals that are really different from those being applied today. No other candidate—not Mitterrand, Rocard, Chirac, Barre or Le Pen—can afford to say: "With me, there will be change; this is what I am proposing, concretely, to do things another way."

## "Will We Have a Leftist President in 1988?"

I am well aware that there are people who are not among these journalists whom I mentioned and who pose this question about the second round "in the name of the interest of the Left," as they say. They ask us: "Anyway, will we have a leftist president in 1988?"

I want to answer them: "This is not a question for the future! We already have a socialist president of the republic today. For 6 years, he has been exercising all the powers that his position involves. And what has that brought you? I said it: before 1986, austerity, unemployment, and a more and more difficult life; in 1986, the return of the Right, and since 1986, with that president in the palace and Chirac in the prime minister's office, a policy that is worse than ever."

Where is the Left in all this? Where is its interest? What is its future if we continue this way? Here also, it is in the first round, by the number of votes for the Communist candidate, that everything will come about.

For, as far as we are concerned, everything is clear. We are playing cards on the table. The political perspective that is the context for our action is without any ambiguity.

## Meaning of the Communist Vote and Socialist Vote in 1988

We must understand this: in 1988, even if those who vote for the Socialist candidate and those who vote for the Communist candidate should meet in the same vote in the second round, the choices they will have made in the first round will have been radically, totally different: they will be opposite choices.

As we explained to the Central Committee: "In the present conditions, giving a vote to the Socialist Party means approving its past action when it had full powers from 1981 to 1986, and encouraging it to commit itself after 1988 to the bad course it has chosen, alliance with the Right to pursue the same policy."

Voting Communist will mean saying the opposite. It will be condemning the rightist policy currently being implemented, which has approval of Francois Mitterrand, Michel Rocard, and the Socialist leaders. It will mean declaring support of the specific and coherent proposals revealed in a program, for which, strong with the popular support given them in this election, the Communists will continue to act. It will mean really giving us the means to see the result turn to the favorable side; that of justice, freedom and peace.

#### Mobilization Vote

That is why the Communist vote, the vote that is useful toward change, has the vocation to mobilize millions and millions of voters in the first round.

It is a huge effort that we will have to make to appeal to all of them not to let themselves be swindled of the first round, which alone will enable them to be counted and count in this election. As for our attitude toward the second round, we were clear at the same Central Committee session, and this position was approved in all the federations. We said: "We will determine it with the major concern to respect the choices that the Communists made at their congress. In other words, we will determine it as a function of what will be of a nature to advance the proposals of our program, even as to what will be least likely to be an obstacle to it."

#### Trumps of the Communist Campaign

As of tomorrow, then, the Communist candidate will have been named. Our party's campaign will get underway. Naturally, this campaign will gain intensity as the election date approaches.

In conducting this campaign, we will be relying on two basic trumps.

The first will be our policy: the outcome that it offers to France, and the concrete proposals that the party's program will contain. We are going to decide on it together, from September to December, as part of the preparation and proceedings of the 26th Congress. In this way, every Communist will be a coauthor, by enriching this program and this policy with his reflection, creative spirit, and experience.

Our second trump will be our party: the hundreds of thousands of Communists who want to conduct an ardent and mobilized campaign with their candidate, whom they will have democratically chosen. As we have said: "The other parties have and will have money and power; we ourselves will have the strength of conviction of our members in the direct contact with the people." Our objective is the mobilization of millions of votes. We are thus going to appeal to the reflection of millions and millions of people. By addressing ourselves to their good sense, experience, sensitivity, and intelligence.

## We Must Conduct an Exceptional Campaign in Depth

For their part, the candidate and the other leaders of our party who are invited by the media will go with the will to respect the listener or the television viewer by talking to him about the real problems posed and the solutions that we propose. We are determined to fight to have our place in them, and we are well aware that to achieve this no effort will be too great! Likewise, we must do everything so that the meetings or gatherings that we organize in the regions and departments are as broad as possible. However, we say right now: the most important thing will go on in the dialogue with the people in each enterprise, district and housing project, each rural locality. Everything will depend on the militant commitment of each Communist in the direct contact with everyone.

We should not hide it from ourselves: we are going to call for a considerable effort from each Communist. Indeed, everything indicates that we can mobilize many voters--some of them perhaps far from us at this time--when the prospect offered by voting Communist is explained to them for what it is. However, what will happen where the opposing demagoguery has a free field?

As we have said, "the party must prepare to conduct an exceptional campaign, in depth, with the objective of reaching millions and millions of people." It will do so by benefiting from all the gains of the new political practice that we drew up at the 25th Congress and have since begun successfully to put into effect; in accordance with the style of work that we described at the Central Committee meeting: a full "capability of each of our organizations to master our policy and to implement it with the people in the diversity of situations"; a full "capacity of each Communist to be a better and better advance guard member, a revolutionary of today, that is, a Communist youth, woman or man, open, forceful, and uniting, who in every situation seeks dialogue and exchange of points of view in order to mobilize and act."

## Role and Responsibility of All the Leaderships

To concretely and effectively mobilize every member for this work that must be unprecedented; leave no strength aside; find the means suitable for using all possible energies, including that of supporters who are normally less involved in the life of the party; take care to constantly strengthen ourselves, and to receive and bring immediately into action every new member: such will be the role and responsibility of all leaderships, at all levels. All this will be organized and prepared starting now.

Comrades, there is no doubt that the battle we are undertaking will not be easy. However, the responsibilities that commit our party, today and tomorrow, are substantial. Like today, we are going to face them.

With all Communists, these militants of struggle and of hope; with their candidate who, if we so decide together, will be Andre Lajoinie, we are going to open a new perspective for the workers, for our people, for France!

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## POLL SHOWS INCREASING VOTER CONFIDENCE IN LABOR GOVERNMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jun 87 p 5

[Article by Finn Langeland: "Norwegian Gallup/AFTENPOSTEN: Approval Of Government"]

[Text] More people are satisfied with the Brundtland government than are dissatisfied. This is shown by an opinion poll done in May for AFTENPOSTEN by the Norwegian Gallup Institute, Inc. Of all those questioned, 43 percent replied they were satisfied with the government's performance thus far, while 39 percent were not satisfied. Eighteen percent had "no opinion."

The result is a respectable one, but hardly more than that for Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and the members of her cabinet. The satisfaction figure did indeed rise from 37 percent last November to 43 percent in May of this year. But in February 1986, for example, 53 percent of those questioned said they were satisfied with the performance of the Willoch government.

The question AFTENPOSTEN has had the Norwegian Gallup Institute ask voters for several years runs as follows: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance thus far?

Out of a total of 1,021 persons questioned, 43 percent responded that they were satisfied, 39 percent said they were dissatisfied, while 18 percent had no opinion. Naturally enough, satisfaction with the government is greatest among Labor Party voters and members of unions in the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions. In these two groups, 72 and 61 percent respectively answered that they were satisfied with the Labor government.

Conservative Party voters turn thumbs down on the sitting government. Only 16 percent of them are satisfied. In the "other" group as well, there are more people dissatisfied than there are satisfied (40 as against 36 percent).

More women than men express satisfaction with the government, but the differences are small, 44 as against 42 percent. But measured in age groups, the opinion poll confirms the support problems the Labor Party is grappling with among younger people. Only 35 percent of those between the ages of 15 and 29 who were questioned think Gro Harlem Brundtland's government is doing a good job. By contrast, 54 percent of those between the ages of 45 and 59 who were questioned are satisfied.

## Oslo Dissatisfied

As regards geography, the government comes out best with voters in the eastern part of the country excluding Oslo and Akershus (48 percent). The fewest (35 percent) are satisfied in and around the capital. In addition, among those questioned in the country's three largest cities, Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim, a majority express dissatisfaction with the government (44 as against 39 percent).

Curiously enough, it also appears that marital status plays a role in assessing the Labor government. While 46 percent of married people say they are satisfied, only 33 percent of unmarried people living together questioned share that opinion.

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CSO: 3639/76

## POLL SHOWS SLIGHT DROP FOR CONSERVATIVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jun 87 p 9

[Article by Kjell Hanssen: "Conservative Dip In May Gallup Poll"]

[Text] A week is a long time in politics, and a month is history. Today's opinion poll from Norges Markedsdata tells about history, it gives a picture from May, not from June. Interviews were conducted during the last three weeks in May.

The barometer thus gives no information about how voters reacted to the storm over the agriculture settlement and to the concluding phase of the non-socialist attempt to regain power.

What the poll shows is that the uncertain situation which continued on the nonsocialist side acted as a disadvantage to the Conservative Party and was an advantage to the Labor Party. While the latter still rides high (41.1 percent now as against 41.4 in the earlier poll), the Conservative Party, according to Markedsdata, seems to have been on the declining side all spring.

28.4 percent (down from 29.5) is still better than the Conservative Party's deplorable result in the 1983 municipal elections. But it is a good deal weaker than the showing in the 1985 Storting election.

Doubt

The survey was done in the period after the Conservative Party's national meeting in Tromsø. It was clear then that genuine government negotiations were underway, and Rolf Presthus received a good reception at the national meeting. That this nevertheless did not produce a positive effect (as far as these figures can be interpreted) may be explained by several reasons. In part, many doubted prospects for a positive result. And in part, during negotiations, the Conservative Party was forced to make major concessions to attract an unwilling Center Party.

A Long Way To Go

For the first time in a year the two socialist parties together have greater electoral support than the four nonsocialist parties: 47.9 as against 47.6



percent. If the Center Party is not included and only the three parties which last week voted in the Storting for a new government are added together, the advantage becomes even greater. In May the Conservative, Christian People's and Progressive Parties had 40.8 percent of voters behind them. That is a long way to go.

The Labor Party also benefited from the fact that a number of reports about the trend in the Norwegian economy were not as bad as had been feared, particularly on account of higher oil prices. The weakening of Norwegian competitiveness and foreign economic problems have not as yet had an impact on people's everyday lives.

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DIAGRAM CAPTION

Norges Markedsdata--Political Barometer

The barometer results from a selective correction with regard to the most recent Storting election. The calculated statistical margins of error can be on an order of magnitude of up to three percentage points for results near 50 percent, approximately two percentage points for results in the 10-20 percent range, and down to one percentage point for lower results.

Interviews were conducted during the 12 May-1 June 1987 period.

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## COMMUNIST PARTY PAPER VIEWS NEW DEPUTY CHAIRMAN NEGARD

Oslo FRIHETEN in Norwegian 4 Jun 87 pp 6-7

[Article by Liv H. Andreassen: "Deputy Leader With Grit: No Day Off When Norwegian Communist Party Deputy Chairman Turns 50 On 8 June"]

[Text] Item: One active woman principal at the Floysboen junior high school in a jogging jacket who has tread the ground lightly but made decisions in the Norwegian school system since 1958.

A former girl athlete who, with true grit, knew how to turn a somersault both on the Oppegard executive committee and city council and on the central committee of the Communist Party of Norway (NKP), where she now sits as its first woman deputy chairman.

Ingrid Negard herself is the first to suggest that the NKP has been far from good at attracting women.

"It's not easy to say why, but I do feel that conditions have never been good for the training of girls. They need a secure and caring environment in order to participate."

Ingrid Negard attributes her own position on the NKP's male-dominated central committee to political experience gained outside the party.

#### Forward To A Collective Working Style

"Even if from a purely objective point of view conditions in the NKP are now better than they have been for a long time, I'm looking for more openness not just outside but inside as well."

As an experienced educator, Ingrid Negard knows that positions on such things as cooperation, openness and closeness are totally necessary cornerstones if true independence is to unfold.

"And we've always had too little of that in the NKP. Maybe this has something to do with the party's history, accustomed as we are to standing against the wall and defending something? These essential position issues have never been put on the NKP's central committee agenda. Though we know what

good working conditions mean. It's now high time for the party to think seriously about whether we're to have any chances whatever of recruiting women and youth in the future. Without a collective working style, the NKP has no prospect of achieving full progress."

Even if Ingrid Negard long ago got used to the idea that nothing in the NKP happens overnight, she is pleased by many positive signs.

"We can't ride in the new Gorbachev line, but it has still meant that curiosity about what the NKP stands for has revived. We have to dig in and give signs to all sympathizers. What's happening now in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has to have an effect in Norway as well, even if there's no talk of any direct transfer."

"Do you think this will be reflected in this fall's municipal elections?"

"No, I'm extremely pragmatic and don't believe in a major breakthrough for the NKP. But I hope to do a good job and market and propagandize the party's policies. I see the coming municipal elections as reconstructive work for the NKP, a burdensome process which will take time."

Deputy chairman Ingrid Negard further hopes that the party's most important instrument, the newspaper FRIHETEN, can, through mutual effort, become a fairly good NKP tool.

"But it has to get better, and in this respect the party has just as much responsibility as the editorial staff."

To The International Women's Congress In Moscow

Also on Ingrid Negard's tightly packed schedule is an upcoming trip to Moscow as a delegate to the international women's congress which will take place 23-27 June.

"Do you expect much from this congress?"

"First and foremost, involvement, and I don't think I'm disappointed that the program looks both broad and exciting. The Norwegian delegation has concentrated on two areas: nuclear energy and women and violence."

The size of our delegation is approximately 20 members and seems to be a fine and broadly composed women's group.

And Ingrid Negard is far from being a novice where congresses are concerned.

She remembers with fondness her time in the Youth Federation when she worked on festivals, among other things. As early as 1953 she participated in one in Budapest.

"I think that work on and participation in festivals has given me the most inspiring and the broadest political teaching."

Among her most positive experiences she counts a visit she made last year to Hungary.

"To revisit the country after almost 30 years was a fantastically positive experience in every way. To see the development that's taken place, the openness and the variety even if the country also has its own problems to cope with."

#### Only Hen In The Basket

In a chat with the woman who is celebrating her 50th birthday, the subject of the Young Pioneers is a given. Around 1960, Ingrid Negard's effort helped give the organization its first golden age. In addition to being a Young Pioneers leader, she also fully helped to lay the foundation for the WDU [expansion unknown], a subsidiary organization of the CIMA [expansion unknown].

In 1957 the same energetic Ingrid was the only girl to be found with a job at the headquarters of the WDU in Budapest.

But she does not look back with particular relish on that time when she was the only hen in the basket.

"Attention to the fact that I was a girl was turned into something special. And, as a 20-year-old, I had to behave more like a man and be more self-conscious than I would have wanted to."

Her time with the Youth Federation was better, the years between 1950 and 1960 being a period when many women occupied important positions. Among her birthday wishes Ingrid hopes for greater activity within the Young Pioneers, more women in important positions, and greater awareness by the NKP of the significance of sports.

"Because sports are a terribly important part of cultural policy," as principal Ingrid's index finger finally peeks out from the sleeve of her jogging jacket.

#### Former Girl Athlete

The fact that Ingrid learned to ski at an early age is due to the fact that her parents came from Rena, and that is also where she inherited her interest in the Young Pioneers; her mother was an active participant.

She calls herself an Osterdal girl [from the east of Mo i Rana] even if she did grow up on the bluest heights of Bekkelaget [in the Oslo area].

First it was handball and gymnastics, but very soon politics put a stop for all time to thoughts about competitive sports.

But the interest in sports is still fully there. Among other things, this has resulted in Ingrid Negard's having served as the chairman of the Kolbotn sports team, on which she is still very active.

With enthusiasm she recounts that the wonderful sports team is one of the biggest in the country.

Not the least of all, the NKP's deputy chairman regards sports as an activity which keeps youth out of trouble.

"And we've got to get more involved in it."

How Long Will She Last?

Ingrid Negard has had bigger problems than those with the sports team, notably when she was the chairman and with the Oppegard municipal council, of which she has been a member for 12 years.

"If you want to be in politics, you've got to be quite strong," she conceded.

"You've got to behave on men's terms. Municipal politics has been a hard but a very instructive school. After my first meeting as chairman I went home and whined. The mayor threw one test after the other my way just to see 'How long will she last?' He really tested me but I clenched my teeth and decided I wouldn't bend. He acknowledged this honorably and today we're the best of friends."

Fighting spirit is something the NKP certainly knows how to appreciate more than the most stubborn mayor.

"Hang in there, Ingrid" must therefore be the most obvious birthday wish from party comrades and FRIHETEN to the NKP's first woman deputy chairman.

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## INTENTION TO FIGHT BAN ON OPINION POLLS STATED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 May 87 p 12

[Editorial by J.A.S.: "The Ban on Opinion Polls"; original paragraphing not strictly followed]

[Text] As the reader knows, newspapers are prevented from publishing public opinion polls from the moment that the date of legislative elections has been set. What this means is that the publication of election polls has been banned since Wednesday of last week.

That law may have made some sense in the period following 25 April [1974].

The country had just emerged from a dictatorship, Portuguese experience with elections was limited, and the publication of political polls just before an election could have become a powerful means of manipulating public opinion.

But let us not be completely naive.

In the political parties (or in some of them), there will always be an attitude of distrust toward public opinion polls.

The purpose of election campaigns is precisely that of creating an atmosphere of illusion--with each party trying to instill in the voters the idea that it is stronger than it actually is.

And since the publication of polls reveals the weight of the various political forces, it can be a factor discouraging voter turnout in some parties, and for that reason it is always going to encounter strong resistance.

It happens, however, that in a democracy, the voters have a right to know exactly what they are voting for and to have as much information as possible in deciding how to vote.

If the parties can sell illusions to the voters, why is the press prohibited from publishing polls revealing their relative positions and their foreseeable election results?

This is incomprehensible. More than incomprehensible, it is democratically unacceptable.

It is clear that we are faced with the question of the credibility and seriousness of public opinion polls.

ESPRESSO has already expressed its views on the matter.

In an editorial published a few months ago, we advocated the establishment of a genuine National Polling Institute to oversee the manner in which public opinion polls are conducted and the way in which they are presented in the media.

We are not unaware that manipulation in that field is easy and that it presents an irresistible temptation to some.

A "movement to raise the level of ethics" is needed.

But for that to happen, it is also important that the publication of opinion polls be allowed right up to the day before an election.

The reason is that by so doing, it will be possible to compare poll results with election results--and as a result of that comparison, some companies are going to see their technical credibility shaken, while some newspapers will lose the confidence of their readers.

There is another point that it is important to clarify.

As everyone knows, there are various ways of getting around the law.

All one has to do is disguise opinion polls as "election forecasts."

ESPRESSO has never done that, and it never will.

For two reasons.

In the first place, because that procedure permits all kinds of maneuvering and the greatest misrepresentations. The disguised publication of polls--that is, their publication in the form of forecasts with no technical data being provided and no indication of their source--would, if it became general practice, introduce the law of the jungle in this field.

In the second place, because we advocate a transparent relationship with our readers.

If someday we feel that the law is no longer tolerable, we will violate it openly and without subterfuge--and accept any possible consequences.

For the time being, we are going to fight to have the legal provisions changed.

Thirteen years have passed since 25 April, and the country has witnessed 14 election campaigns and participated in an equal number of elections. It is now experienced enough that, in this field, it does not need to be treated as though it had not yet come of age mentally.

And every citizen is entitled to demand that he be given as much information as possible so that he can weigh the importance and influence of his vote.

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## CONDITION OF LEFTIST SPECTRUM REVIEWED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 May 87 p 29-R

[Commentary by Eduardo Prado Coelho: "The Landscape After the Battle"; italics indicated by slantlines]

[Excerpt] The message that Mario Soares delivered to the country (serene, well articulated, almost pedagogical, and with small refinements such as the very timely reference to Tocqueville) did not tell us anything that was not already known (except by those who, systematically mistaking desires for realities, refused until the end to want to know). But it had the merit of establishing a /psychological threshold/ providing everyone with a foundation on which to begin formulating an uninhibited assessment of this crisis.

On that level, it is difficult not to recognize two things. In the first place, and to do no more than repeat what I said /at the start/ of this crisis, the motion of censure presented by the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] provided precisely everything that Cavaco Silva and his government could desire. In the second place, the way in which things happened and the spectacle of mutual recriminations which we are condemned to witness show that the Left is in fact going through a profound crisis whose shape can be seen in /the existence of three groups in a state of latent or open conflict/: the first consisting of the PCP, the PRD, their "fellow travelers," and frustrated Socialists; the second consisting of the PS [Socialist Party] and those Socialists united around Vitor Constancio; and the third consisting of Mario Soares and his steady voters.

It is obvious, however, that the PRD did what it had to do /in terms of its own interests/. In other words, those people are correct who argue that the PRD presented the motion of censure because it had become manifest at that exact moment that /doing anything was better than doing nothing/. Because one of three things was going to happen: either the PS would reject the motion, thus providing a valuable opportunity to "unmask" the Socialists in the eyes of the Left's most ardently "anti-Cavaco" members; or the PS would attempt to form a government with the support (or participation) of the PRD, and that would bring all the benefits to be derived from entering the government area; or, lastly, the outcome would be what it has turned out to be, and, that being the case, the PRD is now trying to appear as /the democratic, and therefore

the leading, face/ of a bloc which is resurrecting the combination of forces that supported Zenha's candidacy (and which even has the ability to again attract broad sectors of Pintasilgo supporters--consider, as one significant episode, the attitude of Antonio Brotas).

What is odd is that one of the personalities benefiting most from this crisis has been Herminio Martinho. His image is now that of someone who is more independent, self-assured, and secure, so much so that in the popular imagination, which is always ready for radical swings, the idea is beginning to take hold that it is not Eanes who is using Martinho's image but Martinho who is exploiting Eanes' image. That theory is obviously exaggerated, but it does correspond to a feeling that is tending to spread: Eanes is appearing to be more and more the prisoner of the PRD he created. If we start imagining what a great politician could have accomplished in managing this crisis, we easily see that /Eanes is the figure who has emerged from it most shaken/. His entire performance, beginning with his disastrous interview with Margarida Marante, has been colorless, clumsy, downcast, glum, indecisive, and carried out almost in a sleepwalking state.

In the case of the Socialist Party, we must admit that the least fortunate aspect of its response was the way it complained that events had taken it completely by surprise. Since then, Vitor Constancio has acted with obvious subtlety (perhaps too much so on occasion for an unpoliticized public opinion) and achieved some positive results: he has almost always succeeded in coming across as Cavaco Silva's privileged opponent, and to a large extent, he now has the PS solidly behind him (in this respect, we must say that at least for a time, he has distanced himself from his possible rivals for leadership of the PS).

But that "internal" victory carried an obvious price: unity around Constancio was achieved at the expense of an /emotional radicalization/ which harms the /external image/ of the PS and hampers the indispensable smooth relations between the Socialist Party and Mario Soares. Moreover, there is danger of a serious ambiguity because that radicalization is moving in exactly the opposite direction from the one called for in Constancio's political plan. Consequently, the challenge facing Constancio is a simple one: he must very quickly give /unmistakable signs/ that he is able to impose upon the overexcited and shouting mass of his most active supporters the /policy of realism, effectiveness, and balance/ which corresponds to what is traditional in his own image.

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## SPECULATION ON ELECTION OUTCOME; ADVICE TO CDU

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 12 Jun 87 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Text] For the CDU [Democratic Unitary Coalition], that is, for the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], to take 14 percent in the 19 July elections would be an absolute resounding victory. Between 12 and 14 percent could be said to be a limited success. From 10 to 12 percent would be a so-so result. Below 10 percent, the Communists would suffer an appreciable setback.

In relative terms, the assessment is slightly different.

If the PCP took 14 percent, the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] won more than 10 percent and the PS [Socialist Party] fell below 25 percent, it would be a spectacular victory for the PCP, but if the PRD took less than 10 percent and the PS surpassed 25 percent, it would cloud the Communist victory.

If the PCP won between 12 and 14 percent, the PRD stood firm and the PS took a tumble, it would be less than an absolute victory for the PCP, but relatively conclusive. If there were a Socialist recovery and a PRD loss, the triumph would be more apparent than real.

If the PCP only took between 10 and 12 percent, this result could either be seen as a mediocre accomplishment (if accompanied by a PRD above 10 percent and a PS below 25 percent) or a resounding failure (if the PS comes out as the clear leader of the Portuguese Left).

Finally, every good thing that can happen for the PCP, in terms of the PS declining and the PRD holding its own, will be worthless if the CDU cannot take 10 percent of the vote.

This series of considerations on the outcome of the elections with regard to the PCP is presented, in a very schematic way, in the attached table.

In this exercise, the most important factor for the PCP is the correlation between the vote it gets and those of the PS and PRD.

To these considerations, however, we can and should add the overall weight of the fortunes of the Right in the national political picture.

Table: An Assessment of Possible Election Results as They Affect the PCP

<u>Result</u>	<u>PCP Position</u>
1. PCP-14%; PS-less than 25 %; PRD-more than 10%	Excellent
2. PCP-14%; PS-25 to 30%; PRD-over 10%	Very Good
3. PCP-14%; PS-less than 25%; PRD-less than 10%	very good
4. PCP-12 to 14%; PS-less than 25%; PRD-more than 10%	Good
5. PCP-14%; PS-25 to 30%; PRD-less than 10%	Adequate
6. PCP-12 to 14%; PS-25 to 30%; PRD-more than 10%	Adequate
7. PCP-12 to 14%; PS-less than 25%; PRD-less than 10%	adequate
8. PCP-10 to 12%; PS-less than 25%; PRD-more than 10%	adequate
9. PCP-12 to 14%; PS-25 to 30%; PRD-less than 10%	Tolerable
10. PCP-10 to 12%; PS-less than 25%; PRD-more than 10%	Mediocre
11. PCP-10 to 12%; PS-25 to 30%; PRD-more than 10%	Mediocre
12. PCP-less than 10%; PS-less than 25%; PRD-more than 10%	mediocre
13. PCP-10 to 12 %; PS-25 to 30%; PRD-less than 10%	Poor
Other possibilities with the PCP below 10%	Poor

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All the classifications start from the principle that, together, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], without major difficulty, can win an absolute parliamentary majority.

If, by chance, the PSD can achieve that majority by itself, we would have to downgrade the result achieved by the PCP, since it would mean an strong government and thus more to be feared by the Communists. Conversely, if it happens--as appears unlikely--that the Right cannot achieve a majority in the Assembly of the Republic, the evaluation of the PCP would have to be upgraded a degree in the table.

Having outlined this very simple system to judge the success or failure of the PCP in the next legislative elections, we would like to call attention to something much more relevant than the prospects for the electoral results: What the PCP will do if, as appears certain, Dr Anibal Cavaco Silva wins a strong victory and forms a new government in the legislature that will serve until immediately after the reelection of Mario Soares.

In other words, the PCP will have to get along politically with a president of the republic who is the president now and who can be reelected with the support of the central bloc and with a prime minister who is also the present prime minister and is firmly in place for the years to come.

Confronted with these parameters, what can the PCP be expected to do?

It is not going to antagonize Belem, which would be a mistake, because it would drive Soares even more quickly to the Right.

It cannot rush into poorly thought out, casuistic anti-governmental actions, doomed to failure.

First of all, it has to win over the Left, controlling and using the PRD at a distance and provoking or benefiting from the spontaneous crisis in the PS. This way, it could make the support of the Socialists for Dr Soares in 1991 dependent on the Left and, at the same time, could polarize and radicalize the Portuguese political scene--setting the Right on one side, personified by Dr Cavaco Silva, and the Left on the other, largely pledged to the Communist guardianship.

Rather than throw itself into untimely and unpopular offensives, the PCP must avoid two temptations in two different periods--that of the Socialist leadership of the Left, and that of the central bloc, which implies winning over the PS and then preventing the desperation of the Largo do Rato, easily seducible by the PSD 2 years from now. [Sentence as published]. If it is lucky, which is essential in politics, the PCP could even benefit from an electoral defeat for Dr Constancio and exploit it within the PS, as it has exploited--and very well indeed--the inability of the Socialist leadership to understand and avoid the pitfall of the PRD censure motion.

If luck goes against it on 19 July, the PCP must add to the gains it has already made within the nation's Left, prevent the PS from assuming leadership of this Left and invest in long-range actions in which it has been discreetly engaged lately--bringing the small and medium businessmen into confederation with pensioners or promoting unitarian and non-party youth movements.

This is the party's path. It is more discreet, but who knows if it is not much more effective.

To stop it or impede its path is not easy.

The specific implication, for the democratic Left, is to vote for the PS on 19 July 1987--

--even though this Left, to which we obviously do not belong, does not have much regard for Vitor Constancio or is reluctant to hold out a hand to a party that is going to suffer all the hardships of a very long and arduous passage through the desert.

6362

CS0: 3542/103

**PRD VIEWED AS PCP'S 'SOPHISTICATED' WEAPON**

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 20 Jun 87 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Text] The task of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] in the 19 July legislative elections is relatively clear: it must not fall much below the more than 18 percent which it unexpectedly won on 5 October 1985.

Anything that it wins above 15 percent is a spectacular and overwhelming triumph.

If the PRD wins between 12 and 14 percent, it would still be a resounding success, considering the most recent political precedents.

Between 10 and 12 percent would be a reasonable result, although far from representing a noteworthy victory.

If the PRD wins less than 10 percent, the situation changes drastically; then the PRD could and should be considered defeated, beaten, whipped. If it remains above 8 percent but below 10 percent, it would be in a mediocre political position. If it cannot achieve even 8 percent, its situation would be classified as poor.

Having presented this extremely simple picture of the possible election prospects for the PRD, we would add that it is important to keep another thought in mind: that, in judging the success or failure of the Democratic Renewalists, their position relative to the Socialists or Communists is irrelevant.

Even if the PS [Socialist Party] wins 30 percent or the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] wins 20 percent, these figures would not overshadow the absolute triumph of the PRD if it took 16 or 18 percent of validly expressed votes.

Conversely, a vote of 9 percent is always a clear defeat for the PRD, even if the Socialists do not take even 20 percent or the Communists stay around 10 percent.

Unlike the case of the PS and the PCP, in the PRD's case, what is important is its specific electoral standing.

Table: Assessment of Possible Election Results for the PRD

<u>Result</u>	<u>Assessment</u>
1. PRD - 18% or more	Excellent
2. PRD - 15% to 18%	Very good
3. PRD - 12% to 15%	Good
4. PRD - between 10% and 12%	Adequate
4. PRD - 8% to 10%	Mediocre
6. PRD - 6% to 8%	Poor

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The difference has to do with the importance and strategic autonomy of each of the three political parties.

The PS has real strategic autonomy and, hence, it is relevant to know not only the amount of its own electoral weight but also of its capacity to influence the Portuguese Left.

In other words, what is the relation between the PS and the other parties on the Left? Does the PS dominate the PCP and the PRD, or, on the contrary, are these latter two, together, predominant over the Socialists?

The PCP also has effective strategic autonomy--which, incidentally, it has exhaustively demonstrated--and so it is important to ascertain if it can directly or indirectly determine the political orientation of the Portuguese Left or if it must give way to the PS. In other words, it is not enough to know the size of the PCP vote. It is also essential to examine the PS and PRD vote, to determine whether the Socialists can prevail over the Communists and Democratic Renewalists combined, or if these two parties together can beat out the Socialists.

With regard to the PRD, it is a different story.

The PRD does not have a truly independent political strategy; rather, it is a long arm of the PCP and of the latter's strategy.

In the nation's Left, there are two projects, two strategies, two potentially decisive forces: the PS and the PCP.

The PS led from 1976 to 1978 and from 1983 to 1985. The PCP dominated from 1974 to 1976 and has led the Left again for about the last 2 years. Between 1979 and 1982, the one-on-one feud ended in the victory of the PS in the constitutional revision of 1982, but in a reversal at the polls, specifically in 1979 and 1980.

The PRD was born and exists as an arm of the PCP, an amiable and very powerful arm. Even when the PRD feigns political independence, it is influenced by the Communists. In the motion to censure the government, it did not even attempt

to dissemble; it served as a tactical weapon of the PCP and helped to trap a naive, ingenuous and unwary PS.

However if it is a fact that the PRD is really a tool of Communist strategy, this does not mean it is not an interesting or effective tool. It may even be said that the PRD is an essential part of this strategy. Created to encircle the PS, to besiege it and draw away votes, enabling the PCP to breach the center, its presence is a "sine qua non" in the second phase of the Communist strategy.

A PRD which takes only 6 percent represents a 5-year setback for the PCP. A PRD with 8 percent is an inconvenient interruption of 2 to 3 years for the PCP. In either of these two hypotheses, the possible departure of General Eanes, defeated and politically humiliated, would make it more difficult to exploit the crisis within the PC and to attack Dr Mario Soares in the 1991 elections.

A PRD with 10 percent would be the salvation "in extremis" of General Eanes and would allow the PCP to take a deep breath. If the PRD takes 12 percent, it would even offer the hope of an efficient and decisive offensive against the PS, taking advantage of the 5 years of virtual crisis into which the PS could fall if Dr Constancio does not approach 30 percent. If the PRD takes more than 15 percent, Dr Cunhal will be transported; it would be a confirmation of his political talent, a smiling promise of exultant tomorrows.

The oddest thing about the current political scene in our country is that the obvious strategy of the PRD's expedient insertion in the PCP orbit is either not [sic] accepted or is tolerated by many of those who are said to be diametrically opposed to Dr Cunhal.

It is not [sic] accepted by many non-Communist and even anti-Communist voters, because of the silent endorsement of Gen Eanes; his silence is all the more golden in that he has never been silver-tongued. There are voters who still see in the PRD a vague and confused jumble of nonaligned populism and authentic ruralism, purity of principles, the death of ideology, a refuge of the independents, so they continue to give it their vote. In an opinion (non-election) survey conducted less than a month ago and referred to in the last issue of SEMANARIO, in which the respondents were asked to characterize the PRD, over 60 percent said they could not describe it and the barely 35 percent who dared to attempt it were divided evenly among those who thought the PRD was "communist," those who judged it to be "socialist" and those who considered it "liberal."

Even more curious is the position of so many on the Portuguese Right--and there are unfortunately many of them in the PSD [Social Democratic Party]--who think it is important that the PRD remain firm and solid, even if this benefits the PCP, because it weakens the PS.

It is obviously legitimate to take electoral advantage of the fragmentation of the Left. It is clearly enticing to exploit the setbacks of the PS, even at the heavy price of the advances of the PCP. It is naturally clever to help the PRD attack the PS.



It is not proven, however, that, in politics, it is morally and ideologically correct to apply the seductive theory that any enemy of my enemy is my friend.

In politics, there are primary adversaries and secondary adversaries. For the Right, the PCP and the PRD can never be anything but primary adversaries, by reason of known issues of recent history (1974 and 1975), for reasons of ideological affinities in the democratic camp, for reasons of political clarity as it pertains to most constitutional revision.

In any event, let us see how the PRD would come out in the elections.

For us, the worse the better, For the PRD itself, the closer it comes to 18 percent, the better.

Since 1985, Portuguese democracy has had a new player, which has not been simply or altogether a political aberration but rather an extremely sophisticated arm of the PCP.

Within a month, we shall see if the Portuguese confirm the advances of Dr Alvaro Cunhal on our field of battle by voting for the increasingly less mysterious figure of Gen Antonio Ramalho Eanes.

6362

CS0: 3542/103

## PCP CONCERNED ABOUT LEFTIST INTRA-FIGHTING

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 May 87 p 3

[Text] The PCP Central Committee issued a communique yesterday in which it expressed its "concern at seeing some democratic parties more interested in fighting among themselves than in fighting the Right."

In the view of the Communist leadership, "it is a real danger to the democratic cause that not all of the democratic parties have realized that in order to defeat the Right, their convergence is necessary."

The PCP Central Committee, which met on Monday, said it was particularly concerned about the election guidelines adopted by the PS [Socialist Party], which stress "the unrealistic and misleading ideas about 'bipolarization,' 'alternation,' and 'hegemonization' of the Left."

The PCP Central Committee feels that if the Socialists achieved those objectives, "it would not be to pursue a democratic policy, much less to pursue a leftist policy, but to sign new agreements and the 'pact for ruling' with the PSD [Social Democratic Party]."

"It is a reality of national political life that no democratic party alone is in a position to achieve a majority," says the PCP, which feels that "the formation of a government based on the majority of the democratic parties" constitutes one the principal objectives in this "election battle."

In an interview on Radio Comercial's "24th Hour" program, Alvaro Cunhal emphasized in that connection that "the PCP feels that its participation in that government will be important to the country," although it is prepared to consider "other possibilities" whose characteristics he declined to discuss until after the election.

11798

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## COMMENTS ON PERSONALITY OF PRD'S FORMER PRESIDENT EANES

## PRD's 'Ethical Principles' Seen Abandoned

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Jun 87 p 3-R

[Article by Vicente Jorge Silva]

[Text] "In our party, we don't ask people where they come from, but where they are going." This astounding assertion was made last week by the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] leader, Gen Ramalho Eanes. It was an attempt to justify the inclusion, meanwhile thwarted, of a former Nazi on the party lists; an inclusion which was proposed (as he himself revealed) by the knight commander, Goncalvez Gomes, an avowed Salazarist who has been one of PRD's leading financial backers (see front page of the last issue of EXPRESSO). The former Nazi waived the candidacy, but Eanes did not fail to underscore the esteem in which he held him personally; also voicing his regret at not seeing him as a future Renewal deputy in the Assembly of the Republic.

This minor episode and the nature of Eanes' statements (also stressing that "people can change, and PRD is not a PIDE [International and State Defense Police] type party") would suffice to reflect on the state reached by an organization which demanded strict ethical principles of itself in its crusade to revive Portuguese political activity. According to the logic upheld by Eanes now, any Klaus Barbie in person could be a PRD candidate, requiring for this only "to have changed"; or not even this, because the party doesn't ask its members "where they come from, but where they are going." At its height, through this exoneration of any past (and obliteration of political memory), and the negation of any ethical (and also ideological) criterion, PRD signed its symbolic death warrant, attesting to the vacuum created around a design that has had the image of the former president of the republic as its exclusive reference point.

However, coinciding with these positions assumed, Ramalho Eanes was to multiply the statements, one of them the most perplexing. On the one hand, he announced that, according to PRD, "the door is not locked for the possibility of a coalition with PSD [Social Democratic Party]"; later accusing PS [Socialist Party] of having made "agreements with the right all these years, specifically, when they belonged to the Central Bloc, agreements which misrepresent what should be the affirmation, personal quality, and goals of the left of center." But Eanes would not

confine himself merely to that, even proposing that he lead PS, "to make it assume its responsibilities and prompt it to participate in a different solution for the Portuguese people." However, that was not all. Breaking a tradition of civility prevailing in our political activity, the PRD leader did not even hesitate to conclude that the PS secretary general, Vitor Constan-  
cio, was not an earnest man.

Ramalho Eanes was president of the Portuguese Republic for 10 years, and exercised his two terms in a manner that, in general, appeared to be balanced and democratic. Hence, it was to be expected that, despite the fundamental differences that exist between presiding over the state and leading a political party (and also despite the varied features of his personality), Eanes would be able to perform the new duties with equanimity, good sense, and stringent positions. Now it has become unquestionably clear during the past few days that not only has his leadership proven to be a permanent exercise in disorientation (evoking widespread perplexity), but it could also cost the survival and, in particular, the political credibility of PRD. While, from the notorious incident of the local government lists to the recent initiative of the motion for censure, PRD has been losing along the wayside the feathers of political innocence (and of its so strongly claimed ethical superiority), the image of confusion and distressing amateurism that its leadership is showing at present augurs an inevitable breakdown (or irreversible conversion of the party into a small island of grudges and friction).

The seriousness of its financial difficulties (something that has made the candidacies proposed by the northern knight commander vulnerable) is not an acceptable alibi to explain the "opera bouffe" atmosphere that is present in PRD at present. The temptation of a flight forward that would result from the fall of the Cavaco government (for the obvious purpose of halting the party's erosion through a "checkmating" of PS) now appears even more dramatic and desperate than it seemed only a few weeks ago. And in his first "performance" as party leader in an election campaign, Ramalho Eanes has exposed in all its crudeness the profile of a man politically unprepared on a level that would be claimed unimaginable. It is not just the series of "gaffes" and absurdities that he has been accumulating (since the by now well-known interview with Margarida Marante), now reaching its boiling point; but primarily the uncontrolled aggressiveness that he has been displaying, as if he were increasingly reduced to the position of one being harassed. The contrast between Herminio Martinho's moderation and indisputable political ability and the immoderation and impetuous amateurism of the man for whom he created PRD prove the extent of the tragedy into which the third most voted for Portuguese Party has become submerged.

Meanwhile, in the light of Eanes' current course of action, we are beginning to have the ability to assess, based on a more remote view, and not without some retrospective disturbance, certain past political dramas in which the then president appears as an incarnation of virtue in comparison with the clever schemes of the political group. Perhaps we should begin to admit that the factors for government instability and inoperativeness may not have been entirely dissociated from Belem's responsibility, or that the political contradictions

revealed in the formation of the consecutive governments of presidential initiative were not a mere result of fortuity. In fact, the many trial balloons for a party with the president (a celebration which began with Casqueiro and ended with Herminio Martinho) were a warning of this confused "stone soup" that Eanism constituted.

Now, it has become essential to clarify electorally the relative positions within the left to which a group of individuals divided in the last presidential campaign among the candidacies of Salgado, Zenha, and Lourdes Pintasilgo resorted, in the name of rationality, for the most irrational and fallacious political purposes. The intention was to foster agreements on mutual abdication, based upon the criteria of the useful vote, among the leftist parties, in order to ensure a government majority in the next Assembly. Significantly, the promoters of CORAGEM (Commission to Rationalize and Guarantee the Democratic Left, as these nostalgically antifascist initials read, upon expansion) have converged with Eanes and PCP [Portuguese Communist party] with the essential, although obviously inadmissible mistrust of voting for the Socialist Party, harboring the specter of right wing alliances, that original sin of Soarism (a sin which, however, Ramalho Eanes would not be suspected of committing, despite the doors that are not locked for a coalition with PSD).

In fact, only PCP and PRD (the latter most obviously threatened by a decline in votes) have no interest in clearing up the leftist political landscape, wherein PS will tend to approach a more effective representation of its traditional political base.

After the spectacle of the divisions among the left which erupted after the submission of the motion for censure, and of its own inability to form a minimally credible alternative government, the compassionate promoters of CORAGEM are concealing that reality, attempting to impose from the outside in a new "stone soup" of reformed April-oriented people (against the specificity and differences in the partisan designs).

In essence, it is an effort to "freeze" the last election results (preventing the decline of PRD and PC), and to fix everything at the ideal point wherein anything could have happened if...if a PS-PRD government had been formed with support from PCP in the previous Assembly. In other words, it is an effort to "tame" and remove the character of future election results, in the name of this third age complex which constitutes the antifascist front movement. The time of false innocence in which the underwriters of CORAGEM are registering their initiative coincides with the final mystery of Eanes; the time when he can still survive as a leader of his party. It is an alliance of shipwrecked people who imagine that they can not only conceal the shipwreck, but also, and particularly, their own status as shipwrecked people. Now real courage, on the contrary, is thinking and facing facts without sanctimonious tricks.

## Former, Present Positions Contrasted

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] A few weeks ago, I wrote that General Ramalho Eanes is one thing, and PRD, something else.

That distinction, which is now tending to become irreversible, has two reasons for existing.

The first relates to the general's past, and the way in which the country views it. Let us give an example.

When Eanes criticizes the Socialist Party and Vitor Constancio, the Portuguese are surprised, because they still have fresh in their memory the image of the distant, austere, head of state; and they cannot easily see him involved in the "give and take" of the political partisan game.

In other words, the notion that the Portuguese have of Eanes does not fit into his new role; but the opposite is also true.

When the former president assumes an aloof position, and is even willing to admit that PRD has made mistakes, the country is also surprised; because it is not common to hear a political leader criticize his own party.

Hence, Ramalho Eanes is in the uncomfortable situation of not being taken quite seriously in either of the two roles that he is in a position to play.

However, it befits us to say (and now we are moving to the second reason) that the blame for what is happening is not attributable to the country alone.

The fact is that the general himself often mixes his position as former president of the republic with that of party leader.

Actually, one never knows for certain in which capacity he is speaking.

Sometimes he assumes the untouchable position of one who is above the political game, criticizing the behavior of the parties and of their leaders in the realm of ethics and principles.

On other occasions, he comes down to earth in the partisan struggle, assuming himself to be an adversary of Cavaco or Constancio.

But it is not only in relation to other parties that Eanes adopts a "twofold position"; he has also proven to do so in relation to the party which he heads.

On certain occasions, the general has accepted the PRD strategy, and acts as its defender.

At other times, however, he places himself "outside," adopting the stance of a judge and behaving as its critic.

For example, when Eanes says that PRD was "the same as the other parties" in the preparation of the lists of deputies, he is publicly criticizing all those who participated in that process; placing the other leaders in an uncomfortable position.

As one may easily perceive, all this has contributed to making the Portuguese people's position toward General Eanes difficult.

It is not known for certain what he wants to be, or where he wants to go.

He left the Army, but did not take off the general's uniform completely.

He left the presidency of the republic, but did not totally give up the stance of a head of state.

He entered politics, but he keeps one foot outside of it.

He accepted the PRD leadership, but he keeps the necessary distance from it to judge its actions.

2909

CSO: 3542/102

## RAPID ENVIRONMENT PARTY ADVANCE IN POLLS WORRIES OPPONENTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "All Our Environmental Parties"]

[Text] There are still 15 months left until the next election but there is already a remarkable amount of anxiety about poll results. The Central Bureau of Statistics [SCB] survey of party sympathies that gave the Environment Party a support level of 7.5 percent of those polled has probably led the remaining skeptics to accept the party's rapid progress as a fact.

Somewhat more Environment Party sympathizers come from the nonsocialist than from the socialist side but there is also a sizable group that did not vote at all in the 1985 election. A big election gain for the Environment Party would probably mean vote losses for all the other parties and the SCB survey also lends support to the fear that if that happens the Environment Party will tip the scales in Folketing one way or the other.

People in party offices are racking their brains over how to handle the Environment Party from now on--it is no longer possible to dismiss the Greens. Ingvar Carlsson, Bengt Westerberg and Olof Johansson are the party leaders who have been most conspicuous in the past, each in his own way.

At the Social Democratic Youth [SSU] congress Carlsson launched an attack on the Environment Party without once mentioning it by name. The message was that although environmental issues are important, they are not more important than the Social Democrats' showcase issue: employment. Westerberg tried to engage the party in close combat at the Liberal Youth [FPU] congress, focusing on the party's ambition to control the national economy in detail. But the question is whether insults like "mixed-up leftists" are not more apt to hurt those who use them. Johansson, on the other hand, has explained that while the party lacks a comprehensive view it has still helped to provide policy with a "green dimension."

So far the Liberal Party is the only Riksdag party to respond to the Environment Party's demand for a public debate to take place sometime in the fall. Other parties have reason to accept the invitation now that they should realize that the Environment Party cannot be silenced by ignoring it.



We can expect such a debate to concern differences in social outlook to a large extent--and perhaps it will also indicate where the Environment Party will stand in the choice between a Social Democratic and a nonsocialist candidate for prime minister. But it should be just as important to see what the different parties have to offer in the way of environmental policy in the ordinary sense of the term. The Environment Party's program is quite generally worded here while the Riksdag parties have more precise positions.

If we look back at the more concrete proposals involving environmental policy in the last 6 months, the Liberal Party and the Center Party really stand out in relation to the rest. This year's environmental motion from the Liberal Party contains a whole list of concrete proposals, some of the most important of which concern protecting undeveloped streams and mountain forests, the introduction of environmental taxes on waste discharge under the concession limit and stepping up county councils' supervision of compliance with the Environmental Protection Act. The Center Party is not quite as detailed but--in contrast to the Liberal Party--it has presented good arguments for lowering traffic speed limits.

The Conservatives and the Left-Communist Party [VPK] joined forces with these two parties this spring to form a majority in opposition to a government proposal to develop Rane River. Defections from VPK at a late stage prevented the same constellation from pushing through the abolition of the so-called "5-Section 3" subsidy for the clearing of forests with an "unsuitable assortment of trees."

In spite of strong internal opinion pressure the Social Democratic Party has had a hard time taking new environmental policy steps. A great many things have bogged down in the committee mill while other measures--such as purifying auto exhaust emissions--have been delayed because of economic considerations. It is obvious that Ingvar Carlsson likes to dwell on personal responsibility for the environment but is less willing to talk about political responsibility. Nevertheless he is fond of reiterating that the market economy does not provide any protection against environmental destruction, although in the last Riksdag debate before the summer recess Carlsson did display a somewhat more open attitude toward environmental taxes. And early this spring the government decided on the ban on grass-control herbicides that the Swedish Farmers Federation [LRF] is now protesting.

When the government was reformed last year Ingvar Carlsson saw to it that an Environment and Energy Ministry was set up. But environmental policy, both the government's and that of the opposition parties, is still being pursued in a piecemeal fashion, especially in Riksdag. Recurring Riksdag debates on environmental policy--like finance debates, foreign policy debates, etc.--should enforce a more unified approach. The environment should be high on the agenda, regardless of how things go for the Environment Party.

6578

CSO: 3650/170

## CENTER PARTY SEEN ESPECIALLY THREATENED BY GREEN MOVEMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jun 87 p 2

[Commentary by Goran Schuck: "Center Party and Environment Party--  
Original and Copy"]

[Text] Borgholm--"The hardest challenge since 1956" was the heading when the Center paper POLITISK TIDSKRIFT described the Center Party's situation in an editorial. The comparison refers to the only previous election in the postwar period when the party received less than 10 percent of the votes, just as it did in the 1985 election.

The year after the 1956 election the Farmers' Union changed its name to the Center Party and left the coalition with the Social Democrats--under Gunnar Hedlund's leadership, defeat was turned into success.

But how is the Center Party handling today's challenge? The impression given by Monday's general political debate at the Center congress is that it is mostly running in the same old rut. Despite the party's acute problems delegates devoted a lot of time to reading prepared speeches that repeated themes from previous meetings.

There was little debate in the real sense of the word except when speakers occasionally referred to something one of the preceding speakers had already said. Polemics can certainly be expected when the congress takes up controversial issues later on, such as shorter work hours and more extensive environmental requirements for agriculture. But the first day was characterized to a large extent by liturgy.

It might have been different if Olof Johansson's introductory speech had stimulated internal debate. He hardly did that by noting again that the Center Party stands by its opinions--as if this would make compromises more difficult.

It is true that Johansson explained that there should be no doubt that the Center Party is setting its sights on a nonsocialist government but when the address dealt with the Center Party's independence it was aimed primarily at the Liberals and the Conservatives who are calling for submission, according to the Center leader.

The experience of Thorbjorn Falldin's three-party governments seems to hang over Olof Johansson like a nightmare.

The delegates directed their strongest criticism at the Social Democrats who were held responsible for agricultural poisons, the population concentration in urban areas, open economic gaps and considerably more of what was called "right-wing policy" at the Center congress.

The Liberal Party also had its share of criticism due to the fact that the party reached an agreement with the government on cuts in municipal tax equalization and agreed with Kjell-Olof Feldt that the basic deduction should be eliminated or at least reduced. The Conservatives, on the other hand, received much less attention than they did in the past.

The attitude of Center people toward the Environment Party, the Greens, seems somewhat divided. The "greens" in the Center Party feel, probably correctly, that the Environment Party borrowed quite a bit of its program from the Center Youth League [CUF]; thus they do not want to launch an ideological attack. Instead they repeated the slogan that "the original is better than the copy," but few seemed to seriously expect that this formula will make a real impact. Many apparently expect the Environment Party to take its place in Riksdag and fewer people deplored this outcome. New CUF chairman Iwar Andersson is not alone in hoping for a "green bloc" that could give more impetus to Center ideas.

But in talks with delegates one also hears another argument about the advantage of having the Environment Party enter Riksdag so that neither political bloc has a majority. It is believed that in that case the Social Democrats and the Liberals will start a formalized cooperation, perhaps in the form of a coalition. That would suit the Center Party which would then find it easier to pursue an opposition policy and win back voters from the Liberals. When this has succeeded there will be a chance to set conditions that will shift Social Democratic policy in a direction that suits the Center Party.

These may seem to be unrealistic dreams. But the fact that such ideas are being aired says something about the uncertainty that exists in the Center Party, the irritation toward the Liberals and the feeling of resignation with regard to the Environment Party. One of the Center Party's most serious problems is lack of credibility on environmental issues which used to be the party's showpiece. But when many younger Center people, led by outgoing CUF chairman Andreas Carlgren, want to intensify environmental demands on farmers it leads to rows in what is still the party's social core in rural areas.

It is unlikely that Johansson's assurances that family farms generally function in an ecologically correct way will soothe either side in the dispute.

Here the Center Party faces a strategic choice that requires some of the energy that was Gunnar Hedlund's strong point 30 years ago. The conflict runs so deep that it will be a serious test of Olof Johansson's cautious leadership style--based on listening to opinions and consolidating things, rather than taking the initiative. The Center Party needs more than a mouthpiece.

## EVENTS AT VPK CONGRESS FORCE SDP TO REEXAMINE STRATEGY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Jun 87 p 9

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Social Democrats Take Off Their Overalls"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Politics is taking time out now after a dramatic season that was marked for the Social Democrats by increasingly sharp criticism from the left. But in order to retain government power the party must move deliberately toward the middle.

The Social Democratic Party has become more of a party for the established middle class than for the labor movement as a whole. Now that domestic politics in Sweden is taking a vacation after a trying and confusing spring the criticism from concerned Social Democrats on the left wing is being heard with increasing frequency.

The criticism from the left points up a difficult dilemma for Ingvar Carlsson and his election strategists prior to the 1988 election, which will be his first encounter with the voters as head of the party.

In order to hold onto government power--a leading Social Democratic objective--the party must pursue a policy that is directed at the middle class and that can easily arouse criticism among blue-collar workers or Social Democrats who are more orthodox socialists.

In 1982 the Social Democrats received a renewed vote of confidence for a policy of full employment. Many people believed that after the non-socialist government years a so-called labor government would pursue a policy in the best interests of working people.

Developments have now shown that the coupon clippers have profited the most while the government is doing everything it can in the way of wage ceilings and other measures to limit the buying power of the poorest members of society.

## Nationalistic Werner

But the criticism from the left is hardly a serious threat to the Social Democrats. Today the Left-Communist Party [VPK] is not a real political alternative, even if the nationalistic Lars Werner is able to set the party's course on his own.

The recent VPK congress demonstrated a total inability to discuss the future development of the Swedish welfare state. Instead the congress was devoted to the liturgy of Leninism and the headline-grabbing backroom maneuvering resulting from personal conflicts.

Thus the threat to the Social Democrats' power position is not an expanding VPK but a shrinking VPK that is heading out of Riksdag. But "comrade 4 percent" will probably do the job.

The report of decreased voter support and increased uncertainty among the now varied Social Democratic supporters represent an element of concern.

After several decades of unique agreement and solidarity, several reports suggest that the cement that has held the party together may be crumbling as society changes.

## More Freedom

Many Social Democratic voters think policy is too far to the left. They want the right to make more individual decisions and greater freedom in society, while active party members stick to the old formula of advocating more collective solutions, more social intervention, more equalization.

The structural changes in Swedish industry, especially in the basic industries, iron, steel, shipyards and mining, have greatly changed the Social Democratic Party's political base in recent years.

Workers in heavy and dirty industries were the core of the Social Democratic Party for many years and the workers prided themselves on being able to support their families on a worker's income.

The Social Democrats changed after the dispute over the national supplemental pension plan [ATP] and the debate on the "strong" society and became a party of blue-collar workers and civil servants. In the 1980's workers in the public sector dominate both the party and the union movement.

In modern Sweden the family scene has also been affected and transformed. Now both husband and wife usually work outside the home, often in widely different fields. This can easily modify onesided and oldfashioned class concepts.

And even in the working class a growing number of people accept a non-socialist lifestyle with a house, car, sailboat, big deficit deductions and a sizable credit-card debt.

It is among these groups that are moving into the middle class and have weaker ties to the Social Democratic Party than industrial workers that the party must seek support in order to retain government power. Lower marginal taxes and some caution with regard to reducing the tax value of interest deductions will be unavoidable elements in a new Social Democratic policy.

#### Jackets

The rapid change in the new industrial society where many workers have taken off their overalls and put on jackets has weakened party ties and may lead to a decline in class voting.

This looser composition of the labor movement can gradually lead to people not voting or even moving across bloc lines.

Opinion polls indicate Social Democratic defections among such groups as workers in Skane, voters in Bergslagen, service groups such as salespeople and hairdressers who have never had strong ties to the Social Democrats and discontented county employees.

When Ingvar Carlsson became prime minister in the winter of 1986 he promised to keep the door open to broad solutions, but the spring session of Riksdag that has just ended told a different story.

The Social Democratic government has reached a few agreements on the right and on the left, but the predominant impression is that confrontation has increased.

#### One-Time Tax

The one-time tax on private pension insurance funds that was pushed through, the bid to increase property taxes, especially for homeowners, and the Riksdag resolution concerning employer taxes on the popular profit shares in private companies show that the Social Democrats are still loyal to their old tradition of raising taxes.

Finally public housing firms were forbidden to sell houses and there was a conversion to tenant-ownership rights.

Surprising ineptness in the exercise of power emerged. In the hunt for Olof Palme's murderer the government was taken in by Hans Holmer's PKK lead for far too long and in the Bofors arms affair, credulity triumphed.

In the half-time interval the trend points to a continuation of weak governments. Only a nonsocialist party driven by a pronounced death wish would consider sharing responsibility with the Social Democrats for the general chaos and confusion that has arisen following the murder of Olof Palme.

Thus the government alternative still lies between a Social Democratic minority government that cannot always depend on VPK support and a variegated three-party government, probably under Bengt Westerberg's leadership.

#### No Assistance

There is little prospect that the Social Democrats who go around with the hope that Westerberg will act as a kind of domestic assistant to the government, especially if the Environment Party ends up in the swing-vote position, will see their wish fulfilled. Both in the final days of the Riksdag session and in an address to young Liberals Westerberg clearly advocated a nonsocialist three-party government.

#### Nothing to Gain

And although the nonsocialist parties are busily engaged just now in fighting for each other's votes rather than challenging the Social Democrats, they could certainly form a government if they get the opportunity. At any rate the split in the nonsocialist bloc is no greater than the one in the socialist bloc.

Even if Sweden really should need a strong and energetic government after a period of confusion it is easy to understand Bengt Westerberg's aloofness. The Social Democratic left wing will continue to make a fuss and make more and more demands.

Experience suggests that the Social Democrats will occasionally have to toss the troublemakers a good bone in order to keep them quiet.

Bengt Westerberg, who says he wants to promote more of a market economy and more individualism in this country would have a lot to lose and not much to gain from a cooperation with the Social Democrats on the government level.

Not until the Social Democrats have fallen below the 40-percent level for several elections in a row because social changes have reduced their voter base can different types of government coalition be seriously considered in Sweden.

Today the Social Democrats are too dominant to be a possible coalition partner for a nonsocialist party.

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CSO: 3650/170

## PAPER ASSESSES CENTER PARTY, CHAIRMAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Olof Johansson Remains Unclear"]

[Text] It is uncertain whether Olof Johansson would appreciate the comparison but his method of presenting Center Party policy reminds one most of Thorbjorn Falldin. Johansson's speech at the Center Party's national congress took the form of a fairly unsensational account of the party's policy in a number of different areas that was more like a lecture. One could detect pedagogic inclinations in both the present Center leader and the former one, but at times one also notes an inability to vitalize the message.

As far as Olof Johansson is concerned, vagueness must be seen as a problem. Without Gunnar Hedlund's ability to make obvious truths sound inspired, for example, he prefers to talk in general terms and is reluctant to be more precise. It is surprising to find that the Center demand for lower speed limits becomes in Johansson's version a recommendation that we all take it easier on the road.

But at times the reason for the lack of clarity is all too obvious, as in the case of the demand for a differentiated value-added tax: lower taxes on indispensable goods such as food items and higher taxes on pleasure items. But every attempt to draw a line shows that the argument does not stand up; after all eating can be a pleasure.

In his day Falldin rejected a lower value-added tax on food items with the argument that as a party leader he could not take the responsibility for increasing taxes on all other products. Olof Johansson should also consider the consequences before he gets in a position to try to fulfill a campaign promise.

Judging from Sunday's speech Olof Johansson wants a government change. With a somewhat odd choice of examples--one of them was that national registration should be removed from parish registry offices--he maintained that the Social Democratic government cannot be regarded as especially viable. The alternative, in Johansson's words, is "a nonsocialist government"; this does not commit him to a three-party government or to his own party's participation in the government.



But the only condition he set was gaining support for the Center Party's environmental policy, which would have to be accepted by the presumptive coalition partners--at least if energy issues can be set aside.

But how can this be done? Phasing out nuclear power is obviously still an enormous issue for the Center Party and reality is urging matters on. If the phase-out is to be introduced in the first half of the 1990's, decisions must be made during the next election period at the latest. Hopes for a decision during next year's election campaign appear to be frustrated by the Social Democrats' own difficulty in making up their minds and by the fact that neither the Center Party nor the Liberals want to contribute to the decision. But in this way both parties run the risk of introducing nuclear power as an issue of conflict in a nonsocialist government instead.

But Olof Johansson's emphasis on coordinating Center, Liberal and Conservative family policy does show a wish to form a three-party government. He pointed out quite correctly that the voters expect results in an area where the nonsocialist parties have broad public support, including the support of large groups of Social Democratic voters.

Now Johansson has also revived hopes that the joint working group Karin Soder took the initiative in forming last fall will produce some results; this would require the Center Party to show some willingness to modify its often presented demand for taxed parental benefits, corresponding to a fixed sum. A reservation from Andreas Carlgren, who has just stepped down as Center Youth [CUF] chairman, suggests that there is support at least in part of the Center Party for the idea of expanding income-related parental insurance instead. It will require a considerable willingness to compromise on the part of all the parties--not least the Center Party--if the main outlines of a family policy reform are to be presented before the election.

A party is considerably more than its active members. It is a sign of the Center Party's crisis rather than an indication of its grass-roots character that one in five Center Party voters is also a party member: it shows that Center sympathizers among the electorate are steadily declining in number. If Olof Johansson is to lead the Center Party to a recovery from a catastrophic election defeat and gloomy opinion poll figures he must look considerably beyond the active members who were gathered at the party's annual meeting in Borgholm. The attempt to revive the Center policy that was pursued in the 1960's and early 1970's can certainly create enthusiasm within the party. But what was accomplished by the working groups that were set up after last year's congress in Uppsala shows no great signs of renewal.

The new Center leader is anxious to base policy on the solid support of active members. On Monday the congress will debate the party committee's proposed guidelines for the election campaign; no other party has got off to such an early start. But the guidelines contain so few clear positions that they are more apt to hurt the party if they become the final election platform. The way the Center congress started out, it looks as if the Center Party has a long way to go before it becomes a major party.

## ELECTION DATE, STRATEGIES RELEASED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Apr 87 p 8

[Text] Ankara -- Trying to 'soften up' the political atmosphere by issuing calls for dialogue, and following a 'flexible policy' in public sector labor negotiations -- allowing the 40 percent ceiling to be 'penetrated' -- ANAP has begun to prepare for general elections. According to reports, the premier has decided to call the elections on 10 June 88, 5 months earlier than the expiry limit. Ozal told of his decision, taken at his hospital bed in Houston, to Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Village Affairs Husnu Dogan, whom he had called to U.S.

According to information received from a senior ANAP official while convalescing, Ozal has decided upon the overall strategy for the party's renewal during the period leading to the elections. Accordingly, the party will be immediately put on an 'election footing'. And having considered the political situation in the aftermath of recent by-elections, ANAP will start implementing an 'election economy' by stages, commencing 30 Apr 87. During this period the government will follow a policy loosening the brakes on wage and salary increases to reduce the complaints of workers, public employees and peasants.

## Political Offensive

Now that the elections are moved to an earlier date ANAP is preparing to utilize its political advantages as well as score points by undertaking new offensives. Efforts will be continued to secure a 3/4 majority in the Assembly by engaging in deputy transfers. If ANAP attains the required number it will be in a position to change Article 175 of the Constitution without needing support from other parties. This is expected to create a public image of a party going places, getting stronger.

The premier has also given instructions to his staff that the political climate should be 'softened up' a bit. In order to cultivate inter-party dialogue and ensure ANAP leadership in the formation of the national agenda ANAP will be presenting various proposals to the opposition parties.

Another of Ozal's instructions concerns municipal elections due to be held in 85 places this coming June. The premier wants all ministers and deputies to spend weekends in their electoral zones, saying, "Don't sit in Ankara. Go to the people. Listen to them. Explain our accomplishments again and again."

#### Election Economy

The 'election economy' is aimed at alleviating the hardships and mollifying the discontent indicated by the by-election results. To that end, the first order of business will be to try and 'loosen up' the relations with workers as much as possible. Starting with the 'election policy', to be implemented from 30 Apr onwards, efforts will be made to complete labor negotiations as soon as possible, raising the ceiling of wage increases from 35-40 percent to 45-48 percent thus 'creating a positive atmosphere' among workers.

#### Increases in Salaries

Meanwhile, efforts will be directed at making sure that the rise in the 'multiplier' regulating the salary increases of public employees, due 1 Jul, will exceed current expectations. Considering the by-election results in Manisa and Zonguldak in particular, the government is determined to implement a more 'flexible agricultural policy'. Thus, price floors will be set at higher levels. It is also said that party strategists are busy trying to determine what measures would be needed to prevent inflation as a result of those policies.

Investment will play an important part in the 'earlier election' strategy. Ozal gave instructions to his officials that all projects due to be finished before the elections should be completed in time. To that end, the premier will make sure that GAP (Southern Anatolia Project) will be expedited and that domestic and external credits geared to the project are put into circulation. 60 million acres of publicly-owned land will be distributed to landless peasants, including the Ceylanpinar State Farm in Sanliurfa. Ozal wants to see the 2nd Bosphorus bridges to be completed and the ground for the 3rd Bosphorus bridge be broken by election time. Meanwhile, the highways project will be expedited and completed sections will be put into immediate use. The dams that come under the GAP will be made operational one after the other and ANAP will enter the election campaign with the slogan -- 'Ozal, King of Investments.' Meanwhile, attempts will be made to score points in the area of foreign policy as well -- i.e. application for full membership in the EEC, an 'active policy' in the Aegean.

## OPPOSITION HEAD INONU LISTS PRIORITIES

## Domestic, Economic Policy

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Apr 87 p 16

[Text] Sivas -- SDPP Leader Erdal Inonu said, "If I were premier today I would write off the compounded interest debts of farmers. And I would raise the minimum salary (for both workers and public employees) to TL 100,000. Listening to the complaints of farmers and workers that they were in debt "up to their neck", that they couldn't plant their seeds due to lack of money, and to their pleadings that he should save them from government-initiated foreclosures, Inonu responded: "Be patient for a little while longer. ANAP and Ozal will soon go. This is the most partisan government in the whole history of our democracy. They will go."

In Akdagmadeni, Yozgat, where he spent the night before the Sivas regional meeting, Inonu listened to the farmers and workers tell their stories. Arriving at midnight, Inonu was met by farmers who told him, "Interest payments and stoppage taxes have destroyed us." State-owned banks had initiated foreclosure proceedings, so they found themselves pitted against the state in court. They had come from various small towns across Yozgat. They had appealed to Ozal and ANAP numerous times but no one was listening. With Inonu among them some started playing folk tunes articulating the hardships they were going through.

The SDPP mayor, meanwhile, pointed that though the town was surrounded by forests because they hadn't voted for ANAP their heating wood was allocated from Vezirkopru 300 km away, just to punish them. And that was costing them because of the extra transportation. Listening to the problems, Inonu advised patience, telling them that their troubles would be over with the impending fall of ANAP government. Later, he talked to HURRIYET. Here is what he said:

Farmers, peasants, workers, public employees, small traders are really in trouble. The government has placed all the burden on their shoulders. This must come to an end. Neither ANAP nor

Ozal, nor CWP could do this. Only a SDPP government can bring it about. The farmer can survive not a moment longer. His debt has increased many times over during the tenure of the ANAP government. He can't work his field, cannot afford to buy fertilizer. At the other end, Ozal is still at it with his tricks. He says he will implement land reform. Ozal cannot do anything for the peasant. The one thing he can do is to go on deceiving them. He is trying to fool the workers and public employees in similar fashion. This year he has given a 20 percent raise but inflation is already 50 percent. How is the worker, public employee and peasant supposed to make ends meet? Ozal is not concerned with that.

To the question, "If you had been prime minister yourself today how would you resolve these problems?" Inonu responded:

It is quite obvious what we would do. I would write off the interest debt of all the farmers and peasants. We would enable them to take a breather, offering them government support. We would raise the minimum salary to TL 100,000. Today's inflation and price rises have made that necessary. The salaries of other workers and public employee would be increased in proportion. These would be the short-term measures. In the long-term more substantial measures would be needed.

To the question, "Where will you find the money?" SDPP leader responded: "Where does ANAP and Ozal find the money to give to the holdings and certain circles? That money should be given not to them but to the workers and peasants."

At the press conference following the regional meeting in Sivas, Inonu maintained that never in the whole history of the republic partisanship had reached the proportions it has under the ANAP government. He said:

ANAP is the most partisan government in our democratic history. We are calling all honest and honorable public administrators, the judiciary and the private sector not to allow themselves to be used for partisan purposes. This country and this state belong to all of us. We have to be able to share the benefits as well as the burdens. Otherwise this system cannot continue to exist any longer.

Inonu maintained that no one knew the election date, including Ozal. He said: "Ozal may call early elections in Nov. That's my guess. He might have to call the elections in Nov. We have to be prepared for this date. In the longer term it looks like 88."

Inonu also criticized the U.S. Congress Foreign Relations Commission resolution making aid to Turkey conditional. Depicting

the Ozal government as having no options. Inonu noted that the drawbacks of the hasty signing of DECA had now become apparent. Said Inonu:

Ozal government has no other choice but to call for help from the U.S. administration. The goings on in the U.S. is really incompatible with the alliance. Ozal should better know what he's doing from now on. And he shouldn't be going to the U.S. every so often for medical purposes either.

Having met his party's provincial chairmen Inonu later returned to Ankara.

### Foreign Policy

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Apr 87 p 9

[Text] Sivas -- SDPP Leader Erdal Inonu said his party does not wish Turkey to withdraw from NATO but neither could they accept Turkey's continual exploitation in NATO. "If the U.S. maintains its present attitude we cannot remain in the same alliance," Inonu said.

During a press conference following the fifth regional meeting of his party Inonu recalled the mutual responsibilities Turkey shares with the U.S. within the NATO framework, saying, "We are primarily addressing the U.S. Congress. If the resolution against Turkey is passed it would create a serious situation leading to the cancellation of DECA. As to developments after that we would have to wait and see."

Inonu also noted that if the negative U.S. attitude persists, there would be no point in remaining within the same alliance. He said:

Maybe we should cross that bridge when we come to it. But we are critical of the attitude of the U.S. Congress which is hardly compatible with the alliance and with mutual trust. Turkey ought to show its determination. We are in NATO for defense purposes. And we do that by relying on our own strength. If the issue reaches the point of withdrawing from the military wing we could still manage to defend ourselves relying on our own strength. We were accepted into NATO because our country is capable of defending itself. But, of course, we cannot accept being perpetually exploited. If we continually run into external debt, and a certain superpower has too much say over the matter, we would not be able to speak freely at bargaining tables. We wouldn't be able to defend our interests. We have to look at the issue from that perspective. We won't get anywhere by impulsive actions but it is possible to protect our sovereignty and develop at the same time.

Likening Premier Ozal to a "propaganda machine", Inonu maintained that Ozal had turned his hospital stay in America into a national issue.

Criticizing the reintroduction of the 'Armenian bill' in Congress, Inonu depicted this as an "extension of the negative attitudes maintained by the U.S. against Turkey."

He also alleged that the government was piling the burdens and taxes on everyone but distributing the benefits only to those voting for ANAP. He said:

They are distributing all the benefits to those who say they are going to vote for ANAP. Of course, they will have to account for that when the elections come. Their partisanship has reached unprecedented dimensions. This country and this state belong to all of us. I am issuing a call to those administering the state not to allow themselves to become instruments of partisanship. We ought to share the burdens and benefits all together.

SDPP Leader returned to Ankara yesterday afternoon riding in the party's election bus 'Gunes-1'.

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CSO: 3554/238

## TGNA RATIFICATION OF DECA QUESTION RAISED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 23 Mar 87 p 11

[Text] Whenever a bilateral agreement is concluded between America and Turkey the question arises whether to present it to GNA for ratification, and that is quite natural. Turkey's relations with America concerns the most fundamental aspects of the country's defenses. That an issue of such vital importance be brought before the GNA is hardly surprising, and may be seen as the most logical option.

Yet, governments have usually avoided taking that route, largely to keep the issue from being a matter of political exploitation. But a more important reason has been to keep sensitive information secret.

The issue has become topical once again in connection with DECA and the recent exchange of letters in Washington. Should it be brought before the GNA or not? We should immediately point out that there is nothing secret about the exchange of letters.

Gem of an Idea?

Meanwhile, during preliminary hearings concerning DECA (whether a general debate should be called) a gem of an idea emerged! This idea was so 'brilliant' that if there wasn't too much at stake -- erosion of GNA's authority and of the Cabinet, and even the integrity of the state -- it wouldn't merit mention here. The 'brilliant' argument runs like this: The Constitution demands that only international 'treaties' are subject to GNA's ratification. It says nothing about 'agreements'. And DECA is an 'agreement'. Therefore, GNA does not come into this at all.

Can one even begin to make sense and/or amends for such a flawed argument?



## What Is an International Treaty?

In international law the sovereignty of the state and its 'unconditional freedom' is of the essence. One way to restrain this freedom has been for a state to enter into 'accords' with other states. Moreover, states, through mutual compacts entered among themselves, have created international organizations bearing 'legal personality'. A state can enter into a legal compact with an international organization, without having to belong to it.

Under the Turkish Constitution all such international legal accords come under the term 'international treaty'. And this was done in full awareness. In international practice such accords may come under a variety of names: Treaty, contract, pact, convention, agreement, protocol, understanding, exchange of letters, exchange of notes, acts of settlement and so on. Whatever the name, all these legal terms introduce an element of 'legal sanction' into an arrangement, whether it be bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the framers of the Turkish Constitution, taking these into account, have subsumed all kinds of international accords under the term 'international treaty'.

That being the case, DECA, though it is called an 'agreement', is undoubtedly an 'international treaty' in the constitutional sense and as such may not avoid the process of ratification.

## The President's Role

At this point the following questions ought to be raised: What is 'ratification'? How is it done?

The state may have signed an agreement. Or it may consider signing an international treaty which it had previously refused to sign. The president is expected to sign the ratification papers in line with traditional procedures. In international practice, the signature of the foreign minister is also expected to be on the document. The prime minister may also sign it. And as soon as the document is presented to the relevant external authority it becomes 'binding' for the Turkish Republic. The whole process is conducted as specified in international law.

## The Cabinet's Role

What conditions apply to the president? They are also specified in the Constitution. For the president to sign an international treaty, or a decision to participate in an existing one, it has to be ratified in terms of our national legal system.

In terms of the Turkish Constitution the agency of ratification is not, as commonly supposed, the GNA but the president and the Cabinet. The ratification takes place by means of a Cabinet decree bearing the signatures of all the ministers, the prime minister and the president. The decree having been signed the treaty assumes the force of law, and the document is sent to the relevant external authority by the president.

During the tenure of the 1924 Constitution all international treaties had to be ratified by the GNA, through special legislation. The 61 and 82 constitutions have abandoned that principle. The system had become too cumbersome for dealing with the increasing volume of economic, commercial, technical and administrative agreements as well as 'executive agreements' which are based upon existing treaties. Thus the 61 and 82 Constitutions have gone along with a practice widespread in most democratic countries.

#### Where GNA Approval Not Required

Firstly, under the Constitution, economic, commercial and technical agreements having a duration not exceeding one year require nothing more than a Cabinet decree for ratification, with the proviso that it should not burden the state treasury, not impinge on personal status, or overseas property owned by Turkish citizens, and not impose any changes upon the existing body of law. And it is required that they be published in The Official Gazette.

The Constitution also tells us that 'executive agreements' predicated upon existing treaties may require no more than a Cabinet decree for ratification. Similarly, GNA could pass legislation allowing the Cabinet to be the sole ratifier of various economic, commercial, technical or administrative agreements. But, in all cases, it is necessary that no changes would be required of the existing body of law.

In such (exceptional) cases where Cabinet uses its authority for ratification it is allowable not to publicize the agreements. But in cases where the agreements are of an economic or commercial nature, or where they concern the rights of individuals they would have to be publicized.

Apart from these exceptions all international agreements are presented to the GNA by the Cabinet in the form of a legislative proposal. The GNA, if it doesn't decide otherwise, passes legislation indicating its approval of the agreement. The government then has the choice of ratifying the agreement or not. Having decided positively it then issues a Cabinet decree bearing the president's signature.

#### What About DECA?

Now, let's talk about DECA... DECA is an 'executive agreement' based upon the North Atlantic Treaty which is binding on Turkey, and carries the status of Turkish law, as it has been ratified previously through appropriate procedure. Therefore, the government is under no obligation to bring the recent exchange of letters to GNA. But, despite that, the government, if it so wishes, may attach it to a bill and present it to GNA for ratification. But in both cases it has to undergo ratification through a Cabinet decree.

#### What Should the Government Do?

Well, if the question is whether the government should present the exchange of letters to the ratification of GNA, the answer is yes! No doubt the opposition, wholly or in part, will vote negatively. But, so far as we know, none of the political tendencies demanding that Turkey should get out of NATO, or are opposed, in principle, to entering into bilateral agreements with the U.S. are represented in the GNA. Therefore, the only conclusion that may be drawn from a 'negative vote' would be that the agreement had been found wanting in some way.

And there is good cause for America to know that there are quite a few Turkish citizens who happen to think that way.

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## IMPACT ON EEC MEMBERSHIP OF COOPERATIVES LAW AMENDMENT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 25 Mar 87 p 10

[Article by Ziya Gokalp Mulayim]

[Text] The government intends to change the Cooperatives Law (no. 1163). To this end, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Industry and Trade have prepared two different legislative proposals, and the Prime Minister's Office has decided to establish a special commission to integrate the two bills together. The government's proposals are said to be about changing the rules and procedures of accountability. Accordingly, relevant ministries will be empowered to appoint public officials to the cooperatives' board of management and auditing board. We don't yet know what other changes are envisioned in the Law but newspaper reports indicate that the government is preparing to bring the cooperatives, hitherto independent under the direction of the state.

The subject is of wide interest as close to 6 million are partners in cooperatives. We ought to point out from the outset that agricultural retail and agricultural credit cooperatives, (with their 2,5 million partners and considerable role in the economy) have been under the direction of the state since 35. Briefly going through their chequered history, agricultural credit cooperatives were relieved of their state connections to a significant extent in 72 (in line with law no. 1581) only to be brought back to where they were before, as a result of decrees issued in 84. The irony is that after 72 there were great expectations in the cooperative movement that both agricultural cooperatives would be further democratized. But those hopes were dashed in 84 as a result of decrees (nos. 237 and 238) which later were passed through the Assembly becoming law in 85 (nos. 3186 and 3223). With the reintroduction of state controls the movement has been stalled, set back to the pre-1935 period. All the top managers

were replaced by the government with the result that cooperatives have been turned into SEEs, or close.

#### Towards a State-directed Cooperative Movement

In Turkey, all cooperatives apart from agricultural retail and agricultural credit, operate under the 1969 Cooperatives Law (no. 1163). Cooperatives founded under this law -- consumers, small business, multi-purpose village development -- and their higher bodies, are democratic organizations independent of the state, freely organized from grassroots upwards. By charter they are not under state direction. Now the government wants to change the charter and take them under its direction, too. The rationale is that the state can no longer effectively monitor them. The Ozal government, instead of strengthening the monitoring mechanism, is trying to get them under state direction and solve the problem in a crude and once-and-for-all fashion.

#### Democratic Management

One of the six internationally-recognized principles of the cooperative movement is 'democratic management'. According to this principle, every partner, whatever his share, has one vote at the general meeting. This is based upon not only the one man, one vote principle but also the practice of self-management -- electing the board of management, the auditors and working with managers and accountants appointed by those boards in a democratic fashion. Thus, those managing the cooperatives are accountable to the real owners, their partners who elect them. Partners may criticize and, if need be, change the managers. An organization which does not subscribe to the principle of one man, one vote and is not run by freely elected persons is not viewed as a genuine cooperative around the world.

Now the government wants to change the law, and be able to appoint public officials to management and auditing boards of cooperatives operating under Law No. 1163. In other words, it wants to have the power to deny those cooperatives their democratic character, take them under the direction of the state, and totally ignore the principle of democratic management.

#### Western Practice

One should point out that while the principle of democratic management is under attack in Turkey, in the West, cooperatives are increasingly moving towards organizing themselves on an international basis. They have formed a caucus at the European Parliament. And International Cooperatives Union, representing

500 million partners, with its headquarters in Geneva, subscribes to the view that the impending social and economic crisis and mass unemployment as year 2000 approaches would be overcome only through a democratic cooperativism.

At a time when we are considering joining the EEC, regressing in the area of democratic cooperativism -- an issue on which the European countries are highly sensitive -- won't bring much benefit to our country as well as making it harder to integrate with Europe.

#### Conclusion

If we are contemplating changing or revising the Cooperatives Law, the revision should be in the direction of democratic cooperativism. And that means, instead of bringing the currently democratic cooperatives under state direction under the pretext of more effective monitoring, we should be extending the scope of the democratic cooperative movement to include the agricultural retail and agricultural credit cooperatives, which currently happen to be under state direction.

#### PHOTO CAPTION:

1. Prof. Dr. Ziya Gokalp Mulayim -- Postgraduate studies at Faculty of Agriculture, University of Florence, Italy. Doctoral thesis focused on cooperativism. Became full professor in 70. Served as Senator and chairman of Senate Foreign Affairs Commission. Currently teaches at Faculty of Agriculture, Ankara University.

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CSO: 3554/233

## CAREER, VIEWS OF NEW HEAD OF EMPLOYERS FEDERATION BODSON

## Views on Unemployment, Taxes

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 20 May 87 pp 66-79

[Article and interview with VBO chairman Philippe Bodson, by Karel Cambien: "I Do Not Want to Be Compared to Anyone"; first paragraph is introduction]

The Federation of Belgian Companies (VBO), the umbrella organization for employers, is traditionally led alternately by a Fleming and a Walloon. Andre Leysen has completed his three-year term as chairman and is being succeeded in that function by Walloon Philippe Bodson. An exploratory interview.

Bodson, 42, has been able to make a name for himself in our country by getting the once-ailing company Glaverbel, which was heavily in the red, back on its feet. The fact that he needed Japanese assistance (Asahi Glass) in order to do so was less detrimental to his image than was initially predicted. By his own account, he at any rate learned from Japan that you must spend a great deal of time preparing a decision and then quickly translate it into action.

The effervescent Bodson, in his early forties, is the youngest VBO chairman in the federation's history. Over the course of the years, this venerable employers organization has been invariably led by experienced and well-practiced men approaching the end of their careers. The "gray eminences" of the VBO and Belgian business have been the following: Baron Bekaert, Andre De Staercke, Pol Provost, Roger van der Schueren, Frans Van den Bergh, Daniel Jansen and Andre Leysen.

With Philippe Bodson, the wind blowing through the VBO is not only a new one, but a forceful one as well. Some in Ravensteinstraat have already been shocked by Bodson the brainwasher, who freely expresses his fervid ideology. There are many people who must get used to this now that Andre Leysen, the quiet diplomat, has left the chairmanship of the VBO.

Bodson: I have already made it clear that the VBO must seek out more contact with its rank and file, the companies. Our organization is clearly not lacking in capable staff members. Contact between the VBO and the respective professional federations is also going smoothly. But that seems to me to be too one-sided: Where is contact with the companies themselves? In our so-

called commissions, the dialogue between the VBO and the professional federations is the only thing that is systematically given a chance. Why shouldn't the companies themselves be allowed to play a role in the commissions? I am thinking about a proposal in that direction.

KNACK: You are obviously not lacking in innovative ideas as VBO chairman. But 3 years is a short period of time. What are you going to concentrate on?

Bodson: Three years is clearly very little. After me there will be someone else, and the VBO will always continue to push on, that much is certain. As the new chairman, however, I see three problem areas in particular: the functioning of the VBO itself, the general economic situation in our country and the specific position of the companies themselves.

KNACK: What are you going to do first?

Bodson: The most important point on my agenda is to call for a general conference on employment, for next year. I really cannot do that on my own authority. I need everyone's cooperation: the government's, the trade unions' the universities', etc. I want to see the emergence of a broad foundation for as broad a societal discussion as possible, in the hope that this will also bear fruit in concrete terms.

#### Day Care

KNACK: Do you personally see a solution to the unemployment problem? You obviously expect a great deal from a reduction in the work week, part-time work, that sort of formula.

Bodson: Yes, an enormous amount can still be done on that level. It is a trend that more and more people are taking part-time jobs. Some people want to only work part-time. We have to hook into that trend, an attempt must be made to find new formulas.

KNACK: Do you also mean by that the creation of new jobs where possible?

Bodson: Sure. What do you think of museums? Or of nature? I often go for walks and am sad to see how the environment is going downhill. And museum-goers often encounter closed doors. Do you see what I mean? I always say that there is enough work out there, that there are still a number of social needs. Day care. Twenty years ago, when the overwhelming majority of women stayed at home, they were there to look after two or three children. Now that there has been a mass entry of women on the labor market (which I am in favor of), children should not be looked after any less.

And what do you see at day care facilities these days? In some cases, one woman looks after 15 to 20 children. Nota bene: These same needs still exist, and jobs can be created for them. In Japan and the United States, new jobs are created much more easily. Europe has too much trouble doing it.

KNACK: So you are thinking primarily of new jobs in the service sector?



Bodson: Yes, but on two levels. Both on a higher level (intensifying the electronic flow of money, for example) and on a lower level (McDonald's, for example).

KNACK: Aren't you talking about a small number of jobs here?

Bodson: Not at all. Just go to a hotel in Japan. How many people are there running around there, how many people are ready to provide some service or another? It is true that this is often a matter of jobs for uneducated people, but those people need work just as much.

KNACK: Do the Belgian trade unions then have a false understanding of their duty?

Bodson: There are plenty of people in the unions who understand that a turnaround is under way. Most trade union leaders have also adapted their strategy to that, even though there is an older generation that continues to live in the past.

KNACK: Since you became chairman of the VBO, have you had any contact with Belgian labor leaders?

Bodson (laughing): Not officially, on a very informal basis. And I have also heard that the FGTB in fact likes the idea of a conference on employment. I find that encouraging.

KNACK: What is the first task for the trade unions in 1987?

Bodson: Naturally, they must continue to protect jobs. But management must also do that. I think that the trade unions realize now more than in the past that they can cooperate better with management, that they can stand up together for a better goal. The trade unions must make this clear to their members. Employers are not necessarily the bogeyman.

KNACK: Do you see a rift between union leadership and the rank and file?

Bodson: Certainly. And yet I find that the position of the trade unions is coming across more positively than in the past. That could be seen in Limburg, for example. They at least had the courage there to face up to reality and to communicate that to the rank and file.

A Bonus.

KNACK: Management then. Last year there was the Michelin affair, which clearly did not do the reputation of employers any good.

Bodson: Definitely not. That must be said loud and clear. I am 100 percent against that type of action. To me, something like that is totally intolerable.

KNACK: But in practice it is apparently possible.

Bodson (apprehensively): In my opening speech as VBO chairman, I spoke on ethics. I challenged all employers. They can adopt two positions. Either one says, I will remain within the law, I will not break the law. That is the minimalist view. Or one says, I have a certain sense of responsibility, I think "ethically." What happened at Michelin was totally unethical.

KNACK: Can you as VBO chairman help see to it that such situations are avoided in the future?

Bodson: Yes and no. At every opportunity I argue in favor of entrepreneurial ethics, and I will continue to do so. But on the other hand, I cannot take legislative initiatives, other people must take care of that. However, there is one thing that management should not forget: An affair like Michelin always ends up being detrimental to employers. If everyone were to act that irresponsibly, then sooner or later we would pay for that approach. Then you can guarantee that there will be new laws that rightly restrain these abuses.

KNACK: One of your pet ideas is so-called participative management--everyone must feel that they are involved in the company. How do you view that in concrete terms, and will you make a point of it in the coming 3 years?

Bodson: Yes, definitely. For example, I am giving thought to the labor dividend. That can be an element of participative management.

KNACK: You are in fact thinking along the same lines as your predecessor, Andre Leysen?

Bodson: Leysen talked about profit-sharing. What he proposed at Agfa-Gevaert was a trailblazing idea, but perhaps not applicable to all companies. That has to be looked at according to the company, in terms of the number of employees and with respect to the amount of profit. Now it is a matter of putting this within a broader framework, which Leysen did not do. When I talk about the labor dividend, I am thinking about new pertinent legislation.

KNACK: You absolutely want to see that molded into legislation?

Bodson: Wait a minute, what I want to avoid in the first place is a situation in which the phenomenon makes inroads without there being a basis for it in law. Just take a look at what happened with the meal tickets: People began to introduce them on a casual basis and only later did they start to be regulated by law. And now employers may no longer claim a tax deduction for the cost of the meal tickets. A stupid situation.

KNACK: Is there already talk of profit-sharing or a labor dividend within your company, Glaverbel?

Bodson: There is a different system unfolding. Besides their normal pay, employees receive a bonus at the end of the year. This bonus is a function of two elements: company profits and personal merit. However, I would like to add at the same time that participative management does not begin and end with financial compensation to employees. It begins first and foremost with a good understanding of what is going on in the company. That presupposes

information, a great deal of information, as well as talking with management, on all levels. Everyone, from top to bottom, has to bear a certain amount of responsibility. People must perceive that as something meaningful and gratifying, and must be supported in this by a full company culture.

KNACK: The underlying intention is thus to give people more motivation. But is that still possible with the tax burden in Belgium?

Bodson: Everyone complains about that. I find capable workers in my company who say, "Overtime? Why should I work overtime for the tax man?"

KNACK: That is a complaint that has been heard for many years. But what will you do about it as VBO chairman?

Bodson: Continue to hammer away at it, again and again. Say that we, the VBO, are an avowed advocate of lowering taxes.

KNACK: You have just come from talking to Prime Minister Martens. Did you discuss that with him?

Bodson (laughing): No, I didn't have a chance to. We were forced to talk about other things, mostly about the Fourons question. As a business leader, I was horrified. Imagine a government falling over an issue like that! You cannot let a crisis develop around that kind of problem, you have to solve it.

KNACK: What sort of situation would you, as VBO leader, find yourself in if this government were to fall?

Bodson: A catastrophe for the business community. In very concrete terms, it would mean that potential foreign investors would simply avoid our country. I pointed that out to Martens. Moreover, I feel that the media are devoting a ridiculously large amount of attention to Fourons. The man in the street, in Courtrai, Charleroi, Ghent or Liege, is simply sick and tired of the whole affair. They have to learn to ignore it.

KNACK: In your opinion, has the situation of Belgian business improved under the successive Martens governments?

Bodson: Oh yes, certainly. And I am not the only one who says so. De Nationale Bank is noting it as well.

KNACK: But a recent study by the Ministry of Economic Affairs provides a somber picture for 1987. The prognoses are not particularly good.

Bodson (angrily): Prognoses, prognoses leave me stone cold. Tell me something: How many of those somber projections have come true in recent years? It's always the same thing: A bad prognosis gets big headlines in the media, but the positive facts are scarcely discussed. You show me a newspaper headline here: "Belgian economy in lower gear." It's printed in boldface, a prognosis. But 2 days ago, our country counted 8,000 fewer unemployed people; that was not a prediction, but rather an established fact. No one talked about that.

KNACK: But is it not also a fact that the unemployment figure has risen sharply since 1982?

Bodson: Last February the figure rose by 16,000--big headlines in all the newspapers. Now a reduction of 8,000, but not a headline to be found. Tell me why? I would like to impress this upon you: Economics has a lot to do with the optimism of the employers. Economics also has to do with a great deal of psychology, belief in something, the conviction that everything will turn out all right.

#### One Day a Week

KNACK: In your opinion, what qualities must a business executive have? What makes a good manager?

Bodson: Getting things done, that is very important, not resigning oneself to things. For this, he must have a good capability for analyzing, then synthesizing and daring to make a decision. A good manager is also someone who communicates often with his coworkers. And finally, courage and perseverance are also necessary. And a little bit of luck, that too is never a waste. I admit, for example, that I have been lucky more than once.

KNACK: Do you believe in a Belgium moving at two different speeds?

Bodson: That is nonsense; there are as many speeds as there are companies. Each business has its own dynamics. There are good and less good companies everywhere. And I feel that there is no significant difference in the gross regional product of Flanders and Wallonia.

KNACK: This week, Pieux Franki, the company headquartered in Liege, decided from now on to settle in Flanders. Is that significant?

Bodson: Franki going to Flanders--that is fantastic. I think that's great.

KNACK: People in Liege will not be happy to hear that. Especially not from someone from Liege.

Bodson: As a native of Liege, it is of course not that pleasing to see something like that happen, but as a Belgian I have no objections. Aside from that, Liege will have to do some real soul-searching. Ask itself why something like this is happening.

KNACK: Apart from what is happening in Wallonia or in Flanders, does Belgium even have a Belgian industry? Take a look around you: Agfa-Gevaert is in the hands of the Germans, your company, Glaverbel, was raked in by the Japanese. Bell Telephone has pretty much become French. Cote d'Or was sold to Nestle, Royale Belge is infested by the French. Is that still Belgian? Made in Belgium, does that still exist?

Bodson: I do not agree at all with that way of looking at things. I think that Agfa-Gevaert is more in the hands of Mr Leysen than in the hands of the Germans. At Glaverbel, we are not bothered by the Japanese in the least, we

are responsible for ourselves. Cote d'Or is still entirely in the hands of Jacobs and Mr Van Zuylen. Nor can Nestle do anything about that for the time being.

KNACK: But the share of Belgians among the stockholders is steadily decreasing.

Bodson: So what? I refuse to think in a narrowly Belgian context. That is passe. A new future awaits us, a European one. As Belgians we must, if necessary, reconcile ourselves to the fact that big European companies are coming to the fore. But at Glaverbel I have, despite the arrival of the Japanese, no problem with continuing to maintain a Belgian image. A big foreign group is not necessarily a pirate. And furthermore, we do have some not bad eye-catchers, in a European or even in a worldwide context: Petrofina, Bakaert or Solvay, to name a few.

KNACK: How do you divide your time between VBO and Glaverbel?

Bodson: At present it is about 35 percent to 65 percent. But this is the beginning, the warm-up period. Once I have settled in, that will drop back to about one day a week for the VBO. The VBO has a very competent staff that I can fall back on.

KNACK: Years ago you said that you would rather not be a "star executive." But the circumstances are such that you are now becoming that to an increasing extent.

Bodson: I am now being identified completely with the VBO, but the VBO is much more than Bodson. I am simply the representative of an overall structure, a grand organization. On the other hand, I must admit that I will have to learn to live with something of a different status.

KNACK: Are you a Belgian Bernard Tapie, or a sort of De Benedetti figure?

Bodson: Bodson is Bodson, it's as simple as that. I do not want to be compared to anyone. The fact that Tapie is also a singer and arranges for television appearances is his business. But it is not my style. Besides, I ask myself: Is Tapie representative of management in general? To be quite honest, I am convinced that he is not.

#### Background, Career

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 20 May 87 p 77

[Article by Karel Cambien: "Beethoven's Storm Sonata"]

[Text] He is tall, Kennedyesque, talks like a whirlwind and is driven around in a brand new BMW 735i.

Every day, his new coworkers at the VBO are more surprised at this man whom they initially eyed hesitantly but who now, in view of his charm and competence, is compelling more and more respect. "It can only be for the good

of the VBO and of Belgian business," one of his closest coworkers says. Whoever saw the new VBO boss in action the middle of last week at the RTBF (on the occasion of Flanders' Technology International) was similarly startled by the man and his dynamism.

Astrologically, Philippe Bodson is a Scorpio, born on 2 November 1944 in Liege. His father is a merchant and manufacturer of liqueurs. He sells his own juniper liqueurs under the brand name "Lekker," but his family remains middle-class and Catholic. Philippe is the second and apparently the most gifted child. He has an older brother, a younger sister and an even younger brother: Frederique is now part of the team of French television star Stephanie Colaro, whose entertainment program, Cocoricocoboy, is doing very well.

As a boy, Philippe was educated by Jesuits at the Saint Servais school in Liege. He received there a classical education (Latin-Mathematics), but in particular a broad outlook on world events. The "plus est en vous" theme of the Jesuits apparently took root with the 10-year-old, who developed into a bookworm (He read the works of Bourget, Mauriac, Zola, Sartre, etc.) and a particularly proficient pianist. He won his first prize with Beethoven's storm sonata. In addition, he seemed to have a more than average interest in sports, and he also found time to study Greek on his own.

When he enrolled at the University of Liege, he hesitated until the last minute between law and engineering. On an impulse, he chose the latter; he had a vague feeling that he would like to make a name for himself later in the business world. None of this stood in the way of living the life of a college student, with bar-hopping and cutting classes. Bodson: "There are surely a number of my friends from earlier who could tell some wild stories about that period." During those years, he took part in the student movement of that era.

In 1967, he received his degree in engineering, and he knew one thing for sure: that the army would instil little in him. He made arrangements so that he could perform so-called civilian service abroad. In this way, he could learn languages. This took him to Canada (Ontario) and the FRG (Dortmund). After that period, somewhat lonely and underpaid, he moved to Fontainebleau where he aspired to obtaining an M.B.A. at the prestigious Insead business school and in fact had no problem getting one. He also picked up his great love for the Citroen deux chevaux. After that, he stayed in Paris after being offered a good job by the McKinsey consulting firm. After 3 years with McKinsey, he felt that he had had his fill of the job, which had a great deal of substance, but which was teaching him little or nothing about what he really wanted to know: banking.

So he moved to the German private bank Richard Daus and to Frankfurt, a very important center of finance. He had just married a former student at the Free University of Brussels, and they had two children, who are now teenagers. Working for the same employer, he moved in the 1970s to the United States, where he spent about 5 years. In the Midwest, St. Louis, he managed a company for his German bank that built medical equipment. The job brought him into contact with the American upper class, and he was even once a guest at the

White House (under Jimmy Carter). After 5 years, he had to decide: to remain forever in the United States or to return to Europe.

Bodson then began 10 years ago, a mere mortal, to look everywhere for a job in Belgium. His excellent circle of contacts steered him into Glaverbel, where he quickly made his way to the top of the company and learned to speak Dutch.

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## CONTAINER TRAFFIC ON RHEIN WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 4 June 87 p 23

[Text] Container traffic on the Rhein has shown no slackening in the pace of its rapid growth in recent years. Very little is likely to change in the future. So there was good reason to have started operations at the second container terminal in the public Duisburg-Ruhrort docks.

The handling facility, which covers an area of 32,000 m<sup>2</sup> and was constructed to incorporate the latest ideas, offers complete transportation packages from the seaport to the consignee and/or from the shipper to the seagoing ship. They include the handling of containers and general cargo, the containerization of cargoes or the unloading of incoming containerized cargoes and the delivery of individual items. The new Rhein-Ruhr terminal is also a container depot and sees to maintenance and repair.

Rhein-Ruhr Terminal Company for Container and Freight Handling mbH--this is the exact company name--was founded by the trading partners Haniel Reederei GmbH, Lehnkehring Montan Transport AG, Hermann Ludwig GmbH & Co., Mannesmann Reederei GmbH, Friedrich Tiemann GmbH & Co. and M. Zietzmann GmbH. The operating plan for the Rhein-Ruhr Terminal is to offer several services at one time, and in this way it differs from pure container handling installations. Delivery and pickup on the Rhein is carried out using inland waterway container ships, as well as Rhine seagoing ships on regular schedules and as needed. For example, the Dutch company Transbox and the German company CSS each offer two sailings weekly to Rotterdam and Antwerp.

9581

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## BUNDESBahn TO EXTEND RAIL NETWORK

Bonn DIE WELT in German 27 May 87 p 19

[Text] The Bundesbahn is continuing to expand its long-distance rail network. Seven lines, either new or expanded, are to be started in the next few weeks. The projects are planned as extensions of the new Hannover to Wuerzburg and Mannheim to Stuttgart lines, which are now under construction, and together with them they will later form a closed network for high-speed traffic. The following sections are involved:

- Fulda-Frankfurt, 103 km long and an investment of DM 460 million.
- Frankfurt-Mannheim. DM 500 million has been set aside for the 79-kilometer stretch.
- Graben/Neudorf-Karlsruhe, 21 km long, requiring finances of DM 60 million.
- Guenzburg-Augsburg. DM 30 million will be invested in the 61-kilometer long stretch.
- Karlsruhe-Offenburg-Basel. The investment for the 193-kilometer section is quoted as DM 2.3 billion.
- Muenster-Cologne. DM 175 million has been earmarked for the 173-kilometer long stretch.
- Hamburg/Harburg-Rothenburgsort. Two freight train tracks will be built on the 18-kilometer stretch at a cost of DM 620 million.

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CSO: 3620/244

## RAIL TRANSPORT FACES COMPETITION, REDUCED PROFITABILITY

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 27 May 87 p 28

[Text] The Bundesbahn subsidiary Transfracht-Deutsche Transportgesellschaft mbH (TFG) in Frankfurt, which is responsible for moving container traffic by rail, once again showed an increase in volume in 1986. Management, however, has expressed only limited satisfaction with the "record result": the fight for market shares is putting pressure on prices and is reflected in the company's profit situation.

Last year, Transfracht transported 716,000 containers (TEU = 20 feet equivalent units, meaning that the standardized boxes are converted to a 20-foot base dimension) and surpassed the previous record of 1985 by 7.3 percent. But turnover shows an increase of "only" 2.9 percent, reaching DM 296 million.

Guenther Muendemann, Transfracht's CEO, complains: "The economic viability of the different modes of transportation is declining. It is hardly possible to compensate for the drop in prices through increases in volume." He attributes this to the fierce competition among the different carriers, road, inland waterways and rail, as well as to the price wars that are already beginning in anticipation of the opening of the European market in 1992. The only way to operate successfully in this contested market: "We must control costs, because price increases cannot be put through at this time."

This is particularly true for domestic container transportation (in Muendemann's words: "the problem child of the past"), which was in the black again in 1986 for the first time but is still suffering from a substantial drop in prices. The new productivity plan called "Conni"--for container national--is supposed to bring about an improvement in this area, which accounts for one-third of all activities. Its goal: raising productivity and increasing market acceptance through consumer-specific offerings.

Henning Meier-Luederssen, who constitutes the Bundesbahn subsidiary management along with Muendemann, is certain that: "Transfracht will concentrate on those market areas that have high requirements for technical systems solutions with room for technological innovations and growing needs for transportation and information chains. This should result in a further qualification of inland container traffic, with a productivity guarantee, in order to meet in greater measure the huge demand for transportation and logistic services."

The market position we have already achieved in the domestic container business provides the foundation for the market penetration we are striving for."

Overseas container traffic was the growth area in 1986 again, not only bringing additional volume, but accounting practically alone for the surplus balance of DM 665,000. Muendemann's judgment: "We consider the good results in this sector to be a consequence of the InGrid pricing system and the positive response it has met with in the market." InGrid divides the FRG in 145 price zones, known as grids, in which the same price is in effect between every receiving and dispatching station and the particular German handling points.

"This quickly proved to be successful and, as a result, we were able to concentrate traffic flow at major container terminals, create better production conditions for the rail and delivery area, which had a positive effect on the economy of our operations. Freight cars were also more fully utilized, and individual accounting costs for the customer were minimized," Muendemann explained. Overall, Transfracht had managed to increase its market share in commerce with German seaports by 5 to 7 percent as a result of this pricing system.

In spite of the positive development in this business, a biting wind is blowing Transfracht's direction from the German coast. The reason: the Bundesbahn subsidiary would like to participate in the growing amount of container traffic along the Rhine, from which practically only the western ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp profit. Those in charge at the German handling points are afraid that they will lose freight as a result.

Muendemann gives soothing reassurances: "Transportation to the German seaports should not be threatened. Interest in the long route remains a clear priority for Transfracht." On the contrary, he said that the company sees in the offer by the Dutch and Belgian railroads to overlap their ports in cooperation with Transfracht a chance to consolidate transportation's tie to rail and ultimately to bring container business than before to its partners in the German seaports.

In the meantime, what is being called the Opening to the West has become a political matter. In a question to the government CDU transportation expert Dirk Fischer asked why Transfracht was announcing the expansion of its pricing system to the western ports while negotiations with the seaports were still in progress. In addition the delegate would like to know the government's general opinion of Transfracht's offer.

Quite apart from the political track, there are plans along the German coast to deflect what until now has been the most important partner in the delivery and collection business from its plan. One opening: there is a chance if all the railroad users--basically that means the haulage agencies and the Hapag-Lloyd subsidiary Deutscher Container Dienst (DCD)--can be successfully persuaded to undertake some common action.

The three models developed jointly by Hamburg and Bremen differ in the scope and the intensity of their cooperation: a discount cartel, which acts as a

center to conduct price negotiations with Transfracht, a purchasing company, which boosts traffic through the German seaports by means of attractive prices, or the establishment of an "Overseas Container Purchasing and Distribution GmbH & Co KG," along the lines of the company that already exists in combined transportation ("Kombiverkehr").

Two components can be found in all the models: they contain commitments concerning volume from the cooperating partners to the railroad and--they affect Transfracht's current productivity capacity. The question is whether the Bundesbahn would allow its subsidiary's function to be reduced to organizing transportation or the management of business transactions. The formation of an autonomous company along the lines of "Kombiverkehr" means that the railroad subsidiary has been counted out or that its functions are to be integrated into the new enterprise.

There are additional questions that are still open. Will the largest German shipping company, Hapag-Lloyd, allow its subsidiary DCD to align itself totally with the German seaports? When the carriers have to give commitments about volume, will they all still be in favor of the idea? The fact is that since Transfracht's announcement about making the Opening to the West a reality this year, intensive discussions have been resumed. The pressure on the railroad and Transfracht is increasing--but they had no other alternative but to turn retreat into attack, because they had made pledges to the Belgian and Dutch railroads, which the latter demanded should be firmly honored.

9581

CSO: 3620/244

## BRIEFS

LARGE NUMBER OF RETIREES--"Greece is a mountainous country full of stones where half the Greeks serve coffee to the other half," a representative of an important European newspaper wrote at the beginning of the century, impressed by the large number of coffeehouses in Greece. Today, the Swiss newsman's remark could be expressed as follows: "Greece is a mountainous country full of stones where half the Greeks work to provide the retirement of the other half." According to statistical evidence, the relationship between the working and the retired population is 1 to 2.2. Please note that the limits of safety for the continued existence of social insurance institutes is 1 retiree to 5 workers!... But no such luck in our poor country, where every Greek's dream, after starting to work, is to retire... We have retirees of 35, 40, 45, 50 and so on, while everyone tries hard to work in heavy or unhealthy jobs in order to retire sooner... [Excerpts]  
[Athens TO KALAMI in Greek 2 Jul 87 p 4]

/9716

CSO: 3521/157

## GAP BETWEEN SWEDISH, WORLD INFLATION RATE NARROWS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 May 87 p 15

[Text] The gap between inflation rates in Sweden and the rest of the world may be on its way toward disappearing. This is shown by the Central Bureau of Statistics in its report on consumer prices for April of this year. Prices were up by 0.3 percent over the month before.

While the Swedish inflation rate--that is, the change in consumer prices over a 12-month period--dropped from 3.8 percent to 3.4 percent in April, the trend in recent months has been just the opposite in the eight most important countries with which we trade.

For those countries, the average inflation rate in March was 2.7 percent, or 1.1 percent lower than in Sweden.

Last year, the inflation rate in the 24 OECD countries was at its lowest point in 22 years. But now the curve is moving upward again.

The lower inflation rate here at home is due to the fact that consumer prices rose by 0.3 percent in April of this year, compared to 0.6 percent in the same month last year. On average, food prices held steady during the period in question--from mid-March to mid-April--while minor increases were noted in the case of clothing, shoes, and housing.

The decisive factor in this trend was the price freeze imposed by the government on 28 January. Since then, consumer prices have gone up by 0.4 percent. Half of that increase involves goods and services not covered by the price freeze, and the other half is due to political decisions. In the latter case, it is chiefly the higher tax on tobacco that is making itself felt.

So far this year, the consumer price index has gone up by 1.7 percent, and it now stands at 165.1 (1980 = 100).

11798

CSO: 3650/148

## BOOK FINDS COUNTRY'S CITIES LACKING ADEQUATE ENERGY PLANS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 May 87 p 15

[Article by Jacques Wallner]

[Text] To a large extent, Sweden's municipalities have neither energy plans nor energy consultants. This is noted by economist Bo Diczfalusy in a recently published book entitled "The Everyday Life of Energy Policy."

In his book, he ranks the country's 284 municipalities according to how well they have organized their management of energy. The best municipality is Sandviken, which reduced its petroleum consumption and sulfur emissions during the 10 years up to and including 1985, has low electric heating and district heating rates, and has kept its energy consultants. Sandviken has also adopted an energy plan--something which all municipalities are legally required to do, but which only a little over half have managed to do.

Birgitta Olsson, an expert at the Ministry of Environment and Energy, thinks it is bad that the municipalities have not yet pushed through their energy plans.

Olsson says: "The municipalities ought to make a vigorous effort to plan their long-term energy supplies. Especially since nuclear power is going to be phased out."

#### No Subsidies

Bo Diczfalusy also criticizes the municipalities for dropping their energy consultants when the state subsidies stopped in 1986. The small municipality of Munkedal, which has 11,000 inhabitants and is located not far from Uddevalla, clearly illustrates the difficulties faced by the municipalities. Especially since it stands at the bottom of Diczfalusy's list.

"We had energy consultants for 5 years, but then the state did away with the subsidy," explains Hakan Grundberg, head of Munkedal's Real Estate Department.

He says that Munkedal is one of the municipalities in the country with the fewest employees per inhabitant. It therefore lacks the personnel for working

out an energy plan. The job has been turned over to a consulting firm. "But if we had had an energy consultant, things would have been different."

The municipality of Munkedal hopes to decide on an energy plan before the summer break.

The district heating rates charged by the municipalities are also criticized for being far too high in some places. The amount paid by an average customer can vary by thousands of kronor per year, depending on where he lives.

Vasteras has the country's cheapest rates at 19.5 ore per kilowatt-hour. The reason is that the municipality was far-sighted enough to build its district heat distribution system way back as 1954 and that the coal-fired heat-electric station (built in 1963) produces both electricity and heat.

#### Wrong Investments

In the municipality of Bollnas, district heat costs around 30 ore per kilowatt-hour, but this does not mean that the municipality is making big money from it.

"Our rate covers only the costs," says Mikael Strandberg of the Bollnas district heating plant.

He says: "The rate difference is probably due to the fact that our heat-electric station, which is fueled with trash, wood chips, and oil, was built as late as 1983-1984."

Bo Diczfalusy believes that the large rate differences between municipalities are due to the fact that they invested in facilities that were too large while also investing in the wrong things--peat, for example.

Diczfalusy says: "The municipalities have gone to sleep when it comes to energy issues and are excusing themselves by saying that Parliament did not make any overall decisions."

He does not regard that as an adequate excuse, although he realizes that the state has not had a consistent energy policy.

11798

CSO: 3650/148



## DELAMURAZ ON EFTA, RELATIONS WITH EEC, AGRICULTURE

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 28 May 87 p 21

[Interview with Federal Councilor Jean-Pascal Delamuraz by Andreas Fluetsch and Pierre Heumann; date and place not specified: "Entrepreneurs in Agriculture Are Not a Myth"]

[Text] As chief of the economic department, Federal Councilor Jean-Pascal Delamuraz wrestles with a number of urgent problems: the farmers produce expensive surpluses, the watch and clock industry region battles structural problems, and employers demand expansion of work at night and on Sundays. In addition, Switzerland as a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is in danger of missing association with the European Community. By 1992, the EC plans to realize a uniform economic region, the so-called "home market." This means for our country that, as of 1993, we will only have access to the European market under more difficult conditions. Last week in Interlaken, the ministers of the six EFTA countries met under the chairmanship of federal councilor Delamuraz in order to formulate their answer to the "European challenge." In a conversation with DIE WELTWOCHEN, Delamuraz reviews the meeting in Interlaken and formulates the basic principles of his economic policy.

[Question] Mr. Councilor, are you satisfied with the result of the EFTA minister conference?

[Answer] Yes; the EFTA ministers in Interlaken agreed that cooperation within EFTA must be strengthened and that its internal bonds must be bolstered. The proposals to this purpose submitted by Switzerland at the conference have all been accepted.

[Question] Does this mean that EFTA up to now has been asleep?

[Answer] Of course not. But EFTA today is confronted by new realities. Let's take an example: when one talked about free trade at the founding of EFTA, it referred exclusively to goods. Meanwhile the service sector trade has increased significantly in importance, and EFTA must now adjust to this new situation.

[Question] What came out of it for Switzerland in Interlaken?

[Answer] A long list of individual measures was decided on. Without going into the rather technical details, I can tell you that this will make an important contribution to advancing inter-European trade, which is exactly what our import and export industry wants.

[Question] The European Community wants to accomplish the "home market" by 1992. Is that the reason for the greater speed EFTA is applying?

[Answer] First, I would like to remind you that, in its 30 years of existence, the EC has not always kept up the planned pace in its integration--but it also has never cut back its goals. That means: the goal of "1992" is perhaps very optimistic, but at the same time, there is a new elan in the EC--and EFTA is profiting from these dynamics. It is almost symbolic that now, in Interlaken, EFTA as a group for the first time has concluded agreements with the EC.

[Question] Will these new dynamics in EFTA suffice in order to protect our export industry from discrimination in its most important market--the EC--if the EC integration progresses?

[Answer] I believe so. Because you must not forget that Switzerland is a very important sales market for the EC, which the European Community certainly does not want to lose. However, there are two important conditions: we must be willing to engage ourselves time and again within EFTA or bilaterally, and we must be very open with the EC in our mutual exchange of information. It is important to have timely and mutual consultations regarding new projects. On this point, incidentally, both the EFTA ministers and the EC representatives were in agreement.

[Question] How can EFTA make sure that the EC will not increasingly dictate norms and technical regulations to EFTA?

[Answer] In order to prevent that, EFTA must strengthen its initiative--otherwise there will really be unilateral pressures by the EC. But in my opinion, the danger does not exist that EFTA must succumb to the EC on important questions. For example, the EC and the EFTA countries decided already a year ago to intensify cooperation for overcoming technical trade hindrances.

[Question] In the future, will Switzerland negotiate with the EC more bilaterally, or multilaterally through EFTA?

[Answer] Both. Where all-European solutions are possible, we shall naturally strive for multilateral solutions; where it is not possible, we shall continue to go the bilateral way. The EFTA ministers said at Interlaken that they want to expand cooperation with the EC to new areas. Additional multilateral agreements are already planned for next year.

[Question] What new areas?

[Answer] It concerns piggyback traffic [road vehicle loaded on rail truck] and customs regulations. If no political difficulties arise, we can sign these agreements next year.

[Question] So there will be no more bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the EC?

[Answer] Oh no, they will continue, for in addition to the bilateral EC/EFTA talks--in which we naturally participate fully--, there is also "le multilaterale a geometrie variable," that is, a tailor-made multilateralism. I mean to say that not all six EFTA countries must necessarily participate in the negotiations with the EC, but perhaps only five, or two, depending on the subject. For instance, why should Iceland be interested in a piggyback agreement? Here we must be flexible in EFTA, for every country has its specific problems it must solve with the EC. In addition to these two forms of cooperation with the EC, there is naturally also bilateralism. Switzerland is a specialist in that. So far we have concluded more than a hundred bilateral agreements with the EC, and we will continue in that. Even this year, there may be two or three more, for instance, the origin rule.

[Question] What does EFTA think about these proceedings?

[Answer] In EFTA, they all think as we do, namely, that one must proceed pragmatically. But it is important--and in this, also, we have a consensus in EFTA--that we mutually inform each other about our talks with the EC.

[Question] We have the impression that the bilateral negotiations between Berne and the EC will become more important in the future if one wants to prevent Switzerland being confronted with a fait accompli in the area of legislation.

[Answer] One must not see that schematically. We proceed pragmatically. Wherever possible, we negotiate multilaterally. But certain areas can only be settled bilaterally.

[Question] Would it not be simpler to join the EC, the way Austria is now planning to do?

[Answer] Austria gave no indication in Interlaken that it would quit EFTA--on the contrary.

But it is clear: if we leave the initiative to "Brussels" in all areas, that is, if we become resigned--then our economic situation will indeed become difficult. This is why we must get involved and strengthen cooperation. EFTA can easily set a good example--as it did at the beginning of its existence. As I said before, incidentally, I found this will among all EFTA ministers.

[Question] Is the price for not joining the EC not too high?

[Answer] Of course we pay a price if we do not join the EC since, as members, we would have a voice in decision-making in all the official bodies. But on

the other hand, EC membership would mean that Switzerland would have to give up direct democracy, federalism and neutrality, and that I cannot imagine. Just consider that, at the time, 75 percent of all voters voted against membership in the United Nations.

[Question] In which areas will EFTA expand free trade?

[Answer] At the end of this year, an agreement might be concluded concerning insurances.

[Question] Is the EC not so greatly absorbed by its own problems--let's consider its expansion to the south--that it will hardly have time for the problems of third countries?

[Answer] Of course, I am not in a position to judge the EC. But it is clear that the EC situation has become more complex through the new members, since the economic differences within the European Community have increased. Our EC partners in talks admit freely that they spend the greater part of their work hours in advancing the integration of the new members. But the EC naturally is aware that the world does not end at its borders and that it is tied to EFTA by strong interests. Many problems still need to be solved, I don't want to deceive you, but I am optimistic.

[Question] One area not touched upon by EFTA, but which is a hot iron politically for the EC, is agriculture. What ideas do you have to offer on that?

[Answer] There are no ready-made prescriptions. The problems of agriculture consist mainly in high productivity leading to surpluses in certain sectors. Because of our liberal foreign trade policy, and due to international obligations, we cannot easily strengthen protection at the border. A reduction in surpluses is possible only if agriculture imposes strict discipline upon itself. I am glad that, recently, the milk and grain producers voluntarily took the initiative for self-help measures. Similar efforts are underway with meat and wine producers.

[Question] You rely greatly on the producers' self-help measures and hope that this will reduce surpluses. Is the Federal Council not relinquishing its responsibility and overburdens these farmers?

[Answer] No, since the Federal Council continues to define the goals. Take the example of milk producers: through their voluntary measures, they have replaced the second phase for lowering milk quotas planned by the Federal Council. They want to attain the desired lowering of milk production without enforced state measures.

[Question] How is self-help to function if the cornerstones of agricultural policy, guaranteed sales and fixed prices, are not jolted?

[Answer] The idea of voluntary production cuts in order to avoid surpluses and make the market healthy is indeed a great challenge to the producers' self-

responsibility. But I have confidence in their strength and discipline. Of course, the problem remains that there will be some who do not honor the limitation.

[Question] How much time will you give the producers until the state intervenes?

[Answer] I can't answer just like that. But take the example of the producers of white wine. In this case, the Federal Council is ready with measures. We can intervene immediately if the producers' self-help does not work. But I admit freely that it is not always simple.

[Question] Is the quota system the only weapon to make the farmers see reason?

[Answer] No. Personally, I do not think much of this tool, since it is not market appropriate. I hope that in future we can do without it in many sectors. Because we have to gradually get nearer market conditions.

[Question] What is your opinion of direct payments?

[Answer] We are using this tool in mountain agriculture. I do not exclude that we might expand this system if necessary. But I oppose unconditional disbursement of government funds to farmers. It is clear that in the case of direct payments we make demands, such as that production be cut or carried on less intensively. After all, direct payments must not impair the great entrepreneurial capabilities of Swiss farmers.

I have ordered the Federal Office of Agriculture to work out models for various solution proposals and to demonstrate their cost. If the system of direct payments would really solve all problems, it would have been introduced long ago. There simply is no patent medicine for everything.

But it is also clear that a new direction of agricultural policy is a long-term process.

[Question] When will the study on direct payments be ready?

[Answer] I expect a first internal draft this summer.

[Question] Are there questions which are taboo?

[Answer] No, there are no taboos. However, it is an inviolable rule that healthy agricultural enterprises must continue to exist.

[Question] We are kidding ourselves. The farmer today is no longer an entrepreneur. He has guaranteed prices and guaranteed sales. The entrepreneurial farmer is a myth.

[Answer] No. The farmer decides which products he wants to produce. Within the range of some predetermined amounts and prices, he has his freedom. Furthermore, Swiss agriculture consists of independent enterprises where the

farmer also decides on his investments. The entrepreneurial spirit is therefore not a myth, but a reality--however within narrower limits than, for instance, in industry.

Incidentally, direct payments raise a fundamental question for me. Are social or economic goals to be attained by them? This question will have to be answered first. It is not a matter of either-or. A combination of market and direct payments can also be meaningful, as shown by the example of mountain agriculture.

[Question] Does that mean: market prices for all, and direct payments for small producers?

[Answer] No, it isn't that simple. Don't impute something to me that I did not say...I only said that we must get nearer the market price. If one were to introduce the world market price in Switzerland from one day to the next, most farmers--even the big ones--could not keep up and could not survive. Entire sectors would be exposed to dangerous disruptions. But with direct payments to small farmers, one must naturally also ask oneself if one is not artificially maintaining structures which are uneconomical. One must ask oneself this question, and that takes great political courage.

[Question] Because the farmers' lobby in parliament is very strong?

[Answer] That is too simplistic. The interests of the individual groups--just think of the differences, for instance, between small and big farmers--are much too different to create one single political force.

[Question] Not only agriculture, but the clock-making industry also has problems. How many people must be let go before the Federal Council helps the enterprises and regions concerned?

[Answer] Above all we must avoid deciding in favor of artificial intervention measures. Naturally, sometimes there are situations in regions or sectors justifying closing ranks between the state and the community to give those concerned a boost up. The difficulties in the clock-making industry concern above all the Jura region. But they cannot be compared to the difficulties of 1984. At least, the clock-making industry did well in 1985 and 1986. Perhaps this clouded one's view of the structural problems which are now reappearing in some clock-making enterprises. Now is the time for restructuring, since we must not keep enterprises artificially alive which are evidently no longer capable of survival. The situation would have to worsen considerably before we would take additional measures beyond those already in existence--the Investment Assistance Law and financial subsidies for economically threatened regions. Measures to stimulate business activities per se are no help for structural weaknesses, anyway.

[Question] Which measures do you foresee?

[Answer] That I cannot tell you now; we must examine them carefully in the

light of further developments. But there will certainly be no artificial measures.

[Question] Under your leadership, Mr. Councilor, will the Federal Office for Trade and Industry maintain the present policy in the question of working hours and insist on a strict application of the labor law?

[Answer] The labor law is not at all as inflexible as is always being claimed. Nevertheless, it does not sufficiently take into account newer forms of work-time arrangements, for instance, when considerably shortened working hours are combined with longer or irregular shifts. New solutions must be found if we want to stay competitive internationally. In this, we place greatest importance on understanding among the social partners.

A revision of the labor law is in the works. It is up to the legislators to demonstrate the same flexibility and imagination that is demanded of the social partners. If I always support the least possible state limitations, I do not mean that the state could manage without general legal conditions. But it must frame them in such a way that they do not become a tight corset for the social partners.

9917

CSO: 3620/277

## SWEDEN SEES BALTIC INCREASING IN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 May 87 p 11

[Article by Anders Mellbourn]

[Text] The Baltic Sea is a backwater in the superpower game of strategic calculations. But it is close enough to the fronts in both the Norwegian Sea and Central Europe to be included in major military operational discussions.

In 1958, the Swedish Parliament adopted a defense decision whose effect was to start a cutback in naval forces.

The submarine intrusions into Swedish waters during the 1980's have led the defense politicians to reconsider the matter. This year's defense decision is giving the Navy more funds again. There has arisen a new need for peacetime border defense, although the earlier thinking about the Navy's reduced significance in preventing a coastal invasion of Sweden remains in force.

There have been a number of ideas about the real purpose of those submarine intrusions. The most far-reaching guess, expressed in particular by peace researcher Wilhelm Agrell, is that Sweden and the Baltic Sea are now part of a unified Soviet operational area that is of growing significance in connection with developments both in the northern oceans and on the Central Front.

The long-held Western view was that the Soviet Baltic Fleet's main mission was to move into the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean to reinforce the Northern Fleet from the Kola Peninsula. The many navy yards on the Baltic would then serve the Northern Fleet in a wartime situation. From that perspective, the ability to pass through the Danish belts aroused the greatest interest.

Current military strategic analysis does not consider that the Soviet Baltic Fleet has any great potential in the North Sea or the Norwegian Sea. The number of large offensive ships has decreased, and the Warsaw Pact's fleet maneuvers in the Baltic have recently been moved farther east.

According to current assessments in the West, the Soviet fleet's main mission in the Baltic sea is a defensive one. From there, it will defend the Eastern bloc's staging areas for the Central Front.



## Heavy Transport

The Soviet Union has also increased its ability to transport heavy equipment by ship from the Baltic States to Germany's northern coast. This has advantages from the standpoint not only of transportation engineering but also of military policy. It is often said in the West that Soviet troops would not be able to rely on their allies in East Europe--especially Poland--in a wartime situation.

On the strategic chessboard, that defensive Soviet orientation in the Baltic Sea does not mean that the area is of no interest to NATO. According to all official Western calculations, the Warsaw Pact has the advantage in conventional military forces in Central Europe and would immediately gain the upper hand in the event of an unexpected outbreak of war there. For NATO, then, it would be of great strategic value to be able to strike behind the main front with submarine and air attacks on Soviet reinforcements being brought in by sea or along the coast.

According to that same line of reasoning, the Western Powers would like to control southern Sweden so as to use the gigantic "aircraft carrier Gotaland" as a base from which to carry out air attacks on the Soviet Union and East Europe.

## Air Support

Soviet offensive interest in southern Sweden is less great in terms of Central Europe. But particularly when the submarine intrusions have been viewed as indicating preparations for war against Sweden, they have been seen as related to developments in the Norwegian Sea. If the Soviet Union is to participate successfully in the crucial submarine warfare in the Norwegian Sea that is predicted by writers of war scenarios--its purpose being not only to defend its own strategic nuclear-weapon bases on the Kola Peninsula but also to interfere with communications across the Atlantic between the United States and West Europe--it must have air support from captured bases on Norway's southern and western coasts. And to get there, the Soviet Union must be able to move undisturbed across both the Baltic Sea and Sweden.

This is where the argument concerning a unified Soviet operational area in Scandinavia comes in. The submarine intrusions can be regarded as preparations for attacking Sweden, either by a traditional coastal invasion or by using sabotage units that can be brought in directly on minisubs.

In a coming study on the various ideas concerning possible attacks across the Baltic Sea, Colonel Bo Hugemark of the Armed Forces Staff College emphasizes that militarily, they all appear to be very hazardous undertakings. But he feels that the Baltic Sea is of such strategic importance that in a crisis, both big power blocs may be willing to embark on risky operations in what the Soviet Union likes to call the "sea of peace."

11798

CSO: 3650/148

## EXPERT FORUM EXPLORES NATO AIR DEFENSE ISSUES, EFA PROGRESS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Mar 87 pp 72-79

[Article by E.H.: "Fighter Aircraft 90"]

[Text] On 11 and 12 December 1986 The German Society for Defense Technology, in conjunction with the German Society for Aeronautics and Space Flight, sponsored the forum "Fighter Aircraft 90" at the Air Force Officers School in Fuerstenfeldbruck. The talks encompassed topics from the concept of air defense and the Air Force's requirements for the Fighter Aircraft 90 (JF-90), to the technical solutions for the airframe and materials and construction methods, as well as concepts for the power plant, navigation and radar, all the way to the displays. Leadership of the discussions rested in the capable hands of the eloquent former Air Force chief of staff, Lieutenant General Friedrich Obleser, retired.

## Conceptual Ideas on Air Defense Central Europe

The commanding general of the Air Force, Lieutenant General J. Kuebart, dealt with this subject but limited his remarks to the operational aspects of the air defense and thus laid the foundation for the following lectures. Air defense means combating the enemy's air war potential with the goal of achieving spatially and temporally limited air superiority. In the battle against the enemy's air war potential a distinction is made between an offensive aspect--that is, the fight against enemy air forces on the ground, and a defensive aspect. Included in air defense are all measures which neutralize or lessen the effect of enemy air attacks. These measures can be of a passive or of an active nature. Among the latter are included the commitment of fighter aircraft, antiaircraft [AA] missiles and guns, and electronic warfare against enemy air war resources in the air.

Air defense has two equally important, complementary goals:

--Attrition of the enemy in the air as a contribution to the achievement and maintenance of a favorable air situation; and

--Reducing the effect of enemy air attacks--that is, protection from them.

Air defense attain both goals by destroying the enemy's air war resources in the air. Air defense attains the second goal by its very existence because

the enemy's countering of air defense measures ties up offensive capacity which would otherwise be committed against other targets. It prevents the attacker from employing his weapons in a purposeful manner. Since air defense only reacts to the actions of the attacker, its capabilities are consequently to be oriented in respect to the enemy's capabilities--that is, in respect to the threat.

In regard to the threat, General Kuebart stated there is a general conviction that the Warsaw Pact has adopted the neutralization of NATO air defense as an especially important factor for all operational planning. It will be a goal to force a number of breaches in the ground segment of air defense to function as air corridors for follow-up forces directed against targets in the hinterland. The attack operations will be supported by standoff jamming aircraft outside of the range of friendly air defense forces. For some time the Warsaw Pact air forces have been experimenting with countering air defense installations with combat helicopters by avoiding radar detection for the most part by flying under it.

It can be safely assumed that manned fighter aircraft will continue to form the backbone of the enemy's air forces for the next 2 decades. During this time, mission flexibility will be improved by computer-assisted navigation, bigger payload with greater depth of penetration, by flying characteristics and the multiplicity and accuracy of the weapons. Just as in the West, the introduction of standoff weapons (primarily cluster weapons) is also beginning in the Warsaw Pact. Unmanned airborne equipment will take over a portion of the tasks. In its quality, this equipment represents a new threat by virtue of its improved accuracy and naval warheads with which an area effect of great intensity is achieved.




Figure 1: General View of EFA Modules

Key:

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| 1. British Aerospace  | 33 percent |
| 2. Messerschmit-Boelkow-Blom/Dornier                            | 33 percent |
| 3. Aeritalia  | 21 percent |
| 4. CASA (Construccion Aeronautica, S.A.)                        | 13 percent |
| a. These percentages will vary due to changes in exchange rates |            |

Id. Nr.	(a) Beschreibung (b)	Skizze (c)
(1)	Zwei Holme, stringerversteifte Beplankung, zahlreiche Rippen	
(2)	Mehrere Holme, stringerversteifte Beplankung, zahlreiche Rippen	
(3)	Viele beulsteife Holme mit dicken Gürteln, dünne, vorwiegend schubtragende Beplankung, wenige Rippen	
(4)	Viele beulsteife Holme mit dünnen Flanschen, dicke Beplankung, wenige Rippen	
(5)	Zusammenhängende, beulsteife V-Holme, dicke Beplankung, keine Rippen	
(6)	Einzelne beulsteife V-Holme, dicke Beplankung, keine Rippen	
(7)	Zusammenhängende beulsteife V-Holme, stringerversteifte Beplankung, keine Rippen	
(8)	Obere dicke Beplankung durchgehend, dicke untere Beplankung in vielen Streifen mit integrierten Holmen, wenig Rippen	

Figure 2. Basic Box Spar Construction Methods (Dornier)

Key:

- a. Consecutive number
- b. Description
- c. Sketch
1. Two spars, stringer-reinforced wing skin, numerous ribs
2. Several spars, stringer-reinforced wing skin, numerous ribs
3. Many buckle-reinforced spars with thick belts, thin, primarily thrust-bearing wing skin, few ribs
4. Many buckle-reinforced spars with thick flanges, thick wing skin, few ribs
5. Connected, buckle-reinforced V-spars, thick wing skin, no ribs
6. Unconnected buckle-reinforced V-spars, thick wing skin, no ribs
7. Connected buckle-reinforced V-spars, stringer-reinforced wing skin, no ribs
8. Continuous thick upper wing skin, thick lower wing skin in many strips with integrated spars, few ribs

The inventory of fixed-wing aircraft will probably increase only minimally into the 1990's. In the case of rotary-wing aircraft, especially combat

helicopters, continued increase can be anticipated. It can be assumed that at the beginning of a conflict in the Central European Sector including the Baltic Sea approaches, over 5,000 combat aircraft, 1,000 of which would be combat helicopters, would be available for offensive missions. Thus, it can be asserted that, since the middle of the 1970's, the Warsaw Pact has been systematically modernizing and strengthening its tactical air attack potential through

- conversion to combat aircraft of considerably higher performance, and
- organizing new combat helicopter units, as well as
- improvement of the weapons arsenal.

Although the training of the pilots and the operational procedures do not yet--from NATO's point of view--fully correspond to the performance capabilities of the new combat aircraft, it is to be expected that these weaknesses will be eliminated by the end of the 1980's. The air defense concept orients itself in accordance with this threat analysis. Included among air defense's combat resources are ground-based AA weapons and fighter aircraft, as well as electronic warfare resources which prevent the attacker from reaching his goal.

AA weapons are especially suited for the defense of individual installations but their deployment over greater distances requires time and therefore, these weapons must be positioned, prior to the initiation of combat operations, where they are to go into actions.

In contract, fighter aircraft are the flexible element of air defense. They permit the transfer of centers of resistance over large distances, the securing of flanks and the closing of gaps, as well as escort protection and fighter thrusts into enemy territory. Heavy attrition of men and materiel will occur, however, if fighter forces are maintained for long periods of time at a high state of readiness without there being a prospect of a defensive success under certain circumstances.

The consideration concerning commitment of air defense resources require taking our geostrategic situation and the number, kind and situation of the installations to be defended, into account.

Area defense and point defense have taken shape as forms of air defense, whereby point defense does not necessarily refer to one object to be defended, but can include clusters of objects. Thus, the transition from point defense to area defense is fluid.

The air defense of all the concerned allies is integrated within NATO even in peacetime. The Federal Republic of German, to be sure, in contrast to the other allies, must see to it that NATO air defense in the Central European Sector must also remain home air defense for Federal Republic of Germany.

In a December 1982 letter, the Federal Chancellor emphasized this German interest and instructed the Minister for Defense to ensure the safeguarding of our interests. Thus, in a working group established by SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] under German direction and in connection with the introduction of the Patriot weapon system for the Central European Sector, a new air defense concept was formulated with the essential characteristics:

--The main effort is an area defense consisting of AA missile and fighter forces in which the bulk of the AA missile forces is concentrated in an easterly AA employment zone. This zone extends from the northern to the southern border of the Federal Republic.

Two smaller AA missile zones lie in the tactical air forces' rear area. Area defense is provided in the areas which do not lie within the operational radius of the AA missiles by fighter forces who will also fend off those attackers who penetrate over the North Sea or by violating Austria's neutrality from the south.

--The integrated air defense is enhanced by point defense with the Roland and By the Army's AA missile forces.

--Command of the air defense forces remains essentially unchanged with the sector command posts and the CRC's [control and reporting centers] which support them providing a picture of the air situation and committing AA resources in accordance with the situation. Only the command of the AA missile forces is being changed. The mixed employment of Patriot and Hawk missiles in defined zones requires command at the "cluster" level.

#### NATO/Air Force Air Defense Resources

NATO air defense has at its disposal F-4, F-15, F-16 and CF-18 fighter aircraft as well as Hawk, Nike, and Patriot AA missiles. The Nikes are being replaced by the Patriots, and, in addition, the Air Force will introduce the Roland and acquire the Stinger man-portable AA missile.

The combat capability of the F-4F fighter will be increased, and the short and medium-range ASRAAM and AMRAAM air-to-air-missiles are being introduced. In the future, the Air Force will provide 22 percent of the fighter aircraft, 70 percent of the AA missile system, and 80 percent of the ground control equipment of NATO air defense for the Central European Sector, and, in addition, there is its contribution to point defense.

From the prospective of this initial situation the, an examination was undertaken to determine to what extent NATO air defense's resources will also be able, in the medium term, to substantially correct the existing weaknesses of its ground-based combat resources. In the process, it must not be forgotten that the desired condition will only be achieved in a number of years, that the Hawk, despite further measures to maintain its combat effectiveness and despite the fact that it is scheduled to remain in service past the year 2000, can only counter the threat to a limited extent, and

also that the fighter component does not--with the exception of the U.S. Air Force's F-15--live up to all requirements. Thus, the introduction of a modern fighter is urgently needed.

General Kuebart termed the situation regarding identification friend or foe (IFF) as one of the biggest failures of the alliance.

In the conversion to the Patriot and the Roland, 6 Nike battalions with 24 firing units will become 6 Patriot squadrons with 36 firing units and 3 Roland groups with 15 firing units. From the present 60 batteries will come 86 squadrons tomorrow. From the heretofore homogenous AA missile regiments AA commands will be formed to which Patriot, Hawk and Roland units, adapted to the "cluster" structure, will be regionally subordinated. General Kuebart declared that demands for absolute protection against air attack cannot be met and

--the centers of main effort must be defined in a cost-benefit analysis and their realization must be striven for;

--a joint, integrated air defense is indeed efficient, but can only be realized by a considerable willingness to compromise on the part of the individual partners in the alliance; and

--an effective air defense must be based on a mix of weapons.

General Kuebart then addressed certain individual problems. The engagement of helicopters has not been satisfactorily solved, and the problems begin already with detection. Possibilities for this would be NAEW (NATO Airborne Early Warning), drones, and a data link with the Army. The use of the Alpha Jet will seldom be economical. Defense against missiles of all kinds, let alone against tactical ballistic missiles with conventional warheads and standoff weapons, is hardly possible at present.

For only now are technologies available which point to a technical solution. For a joint utilization of airborne and ground-based AA defense weapons, the main problem lies in the matter of identification. The interdependence of offensive and defensive air war operations in their effects upon the enemy's air war potential, must be investigated carefully. In this area, we can only plan in a cost-effective manner if we can judge under what conditions we ought rather to engage the enemy right on the ground. More attention must be paid to the interplay between air attack and air defense. A coordination of command functions through ACCS [Advanced Communications Control System] has been initiated. Moreover, a cooperation with the other military services offers certain possibilities. A need to catch up exists in the field of electronic warfare.

#### Air Force Requirements for the Fighter Aircraft 90

The reader of WEHRTECHNIK has been informed about this subject--especially by the article of Brigadier General Andries Schieper in WEHRTECHNIK 56/86, p 42.

Therefore let it only be said as supplementary information that the governments of the partner countries have concluded two memoranda of understanding (MOU), the first of which, as a basic agreement, sets out the general arrangements for the partners' cooperation. It is a kind of declaration of intent and does not contain any financial obligations in regard to development and procurement. For each phase of the program a separate MOU is to be concluded.

MOU number two concerns the definition phase, in the course of which the requisite contracts, as national contracts, have been awarded to the national industries.

Only with MOU number three concerning joint development are financial obligations on the part of all partners to be jointly entered into. As an international phase document, the E SR-D (European Staff Requirement for Development) is to be signed in early 1987, which is to be followed in May 1987 by the approval of the MTWF (Military-Technology-Economical Requirement). The draft of MOU number three for the introduction of the development phase and the conclusion of the definition phase, is supposed to be discussed and approved before the legislative summer recess. There will be postponements in this regard.

#### JF-90/EFA [European Fighter Aircraft]--Technical Solution Including Armament

Really it is simple: In order to triumph in aerial combat, it is advisable to be able to shoot and hit the target quicker than the enemy, and, if this is not successfully at first, to be able to shoot longer and more accurately, whether with missiles or guns, than the attacker. The only question is how to achieve this and Eurofighter Inc. reported on that.

As a result of the investigations into close air combat, it was determined that frontal engagements would primarily be involved in which transient maneuvers would predominate. The periods of high g-accelerations are brief, and the average speeds are low. The firing opportunity is brief, but can be considerably lengthened by fuselage targeting. The combat takes place within a small space. It is crucial to score a hit on the enemy before the latter has an opportunity to return fire. Rapid sighting with alignment of the guns is therefore important. An investigation of long-range air combat proved that a highly dynamic air combat is involved in this. Higher performance of weapons and avionics cannot replace performance at supersonic speeds, but can only supplement it at best. An obsolete airframe can, by even the most modern armament, only be adapted to a limited extent to meet growing threats. Radar range and antenna slewing angle, as well as the integration of maneuvering logic, fire control and flight control, are important. Increasing one's own missile range and diminishing the enemy's in relative terms are also crucial in long-range air combat. Some 50 percent of all combat which begins at medium range ends up as close-range combat. It has also been determined that the course of future air combat will be determined by the coordination of flight performance, avionics, and weapons technology and tactics. The overall form of air combat will be influenced by the new AMRAAM/ASRAAM missiles and






Figure 3. Fuselage Frame with Wing Attachment Fittings (Dornier)




Figure 4. Division of Work for the EFA Power Plant EJ [EuroJet] 200

the possibility of using the guns from all aspect angles. Air combat at the medium ranges is characterized by dynamic maneuvers.

It occurs primarily at supersonic speeds. In close-range air combat the all-angle capability of the new close-range weapons is creating a trend towards low speeds. There is a continuous transition between the two kinds of combat. Thus, summarized once again: Superior air combat capability means for short range a superior, transient maneuverability all the way to supermaneuverability, and for long range superior supersonic maneuvering performance. These are, so to speak, the mainstays of the design concept. The prime requirement of superiority/survival is long-range combat requires superior supersonic maneuvering performance and the technical answer to this is low wave state and unstable design. From the primary requirement of superiority/survivability in close-range combat with the precondition of supermaneuverability, the technical solution of belly intake, canards, delta-wing shape, and unusable design emerges. The preconditions for survivability on the ground are short takeoff and landing characteristics, and this means low wing loading and unstable design. The preconditions for survivability on the ground are short takeoff and landing characteristics, and this means low wing loading and unstable design. thus, the delta-canard concept, which fulfills the operational requirements the best, is a result of the practicalities of a technical solution.

To recapitulate the key elements of the weapons system: delta wing with canard, artificial stability with digital/electronic flight control, belly intake/supersonic intake, convergent/divergent propelling nozzle, low air-resistant (conformal) weapons suspension mounting and signature reduction.

In supersonic flight to delta wing is always superior because of its low wave drag; in addition, it offers good possibilities for structural integration of the wing with the fuselage and low structural weight. By means of the unstable design, greater lift is attained and better drag, since the trailing edge flaps were positively displaced. In subsonic flight this produces good lift-drag ratios which make the delta wing attractive. The base design was selected in such a way that the wing-fuselage is neutrally stable to ensure high-incidence reversibility and handling. The desired degree of instability is thus generated solely by the canard.

The interference canard wing produces greater lift and a better drag polar. In addition, independent control surfaces permit new kinds of maneuverability and a gust alleviation system.

The requirement for high excess thrust necessitates an optimal integration of the intake with the overall configuration, and thus the belly intake offers very good pressure recovery above the angle of attack by means of a fuselage hood cover, and good pressure recovery also above the sideslip since no fuselage shielding creates interference. With increasing mach number a favorable precompression is produced by the forward fuselage. The design criteria for supersonic flight require high intake performance to ensure the highest possible excess thrust. From mach 1.6 on, the ramp intake produces

an external precompression which delivers improved pressure recovery. The rotatable cowl lip allows an optimal adjustment of the capture area to the air mass flow required by the power plant, which varies with altitude, mach number and throttle position. At takeoff and with high angles of attack, the lip is rotated outward to improve inflow conditions and to increase the cross-section. In this way auxiliary intake flaps are avoided.

The design criteria of high supersonic combat performance, supersonic cruising, and extended combat time require great thrust excess and a favorable aft section configuration in supersonic flight. For this reason, the power plant was equipped with a convergent-divergent nozzle. In the divergent portion of the con-di-nozzle a further acceleration of the stream occurs. this leads to an improved utilization of the existing thrust potential in combat and to a considerable reduction of fuel requirements, especially in supersonic intercept flight. A favorable aft section drag, wave drag and base drag are produced by means of the longer nozzle and nozzle terminal surface. The conformal weapons mounting is the type with the lowest drag. In many cases limitations are imposed here since not only drag conditions, but also other marginal conditions, such as exchangeability of weapons types, ERU [emergency reaction unit] limitations, departure characteristics and emergency jettisoning, must be fulfilled.

#### Materials and construction Methods for the Airframe

The contribution "Materials and Constructions Methods for the Airframe of the JF-90/EFA Weapons System" came from Dornier. In order to minimize the mass of the aircraft's airframe, the use of the most modern structural technologies is necessary. understood to be included among these are new materials such as composite fiber materials or new aluminum alloys, as well as modern manufacturing procedures such as digitally controlled milling of integral components; superplastic forming, sometimes together with diffusion bonding; the drape forming of integrally reinforced panels; and other production methods. The necessary structural technologies were developed and tested during the program's preliminary phase. The largest portion of the aircraft's outer skin consists of plastic material reinforced with carbon fiber. Foreseen as exceptions to this area the leading edges of the wings and control surfaces because of possible impact stress, for example, through striking birds; because of the wear and tear of abrasion; and to ensure electrical conductivity in aluminum.

At 36 percent, aluminum has been reduced to second place, whereby aluminum-lithium alloys are to be used extensively. To be sure, these new alloys must be proven suitable and must be available for series production. The rest is shared by titanium alloys (12 percent), steel (2 percent), and other materials such as GFRP (glass-fiber reinforced plastic) for radomes and acrylic glass for the cockpit canopy.

The airframe is divided into primary modules. For the wing of the JF-90 a multispar cross section is planned which is to be produced by the "cobonded" construction method. In this process, the two smooth coverings are first

hardened; subsequently, the unhardened carbon-fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) spars together with the coverings are fixed by means of a device in their final position. Since a covering must be removable, it is provided with mold release. The autoclave cycle which comes next hardens the spars and simultaneously binds them with the second covering. The construction method requires only a minor tolerance adjustment and reduces expenditures for wings and possible sealing problems in the area of the tanks to a minimum.

A CFRP wing would be best construed with a traverse central box without fuselage separation points. A series of considerations led, however, to a solution with attached wings. Figure 3 shows one of the sturdy fuselage frames from the region of the wing attachment with attachment fittings of titanium to withstand the effects of wing bending. The integrally milled frames are manufactured from Al-Li alloy--that is, aluminum-lithium. For series production forge blanks are planned to keep down machining and material usage.

CFRP is also planned for large portions of the fuselage skin. The fuselage shells are equipped with integral reinforcing forms and contain longitudinal belts to accommodate fuselage flexing. The manufacturing parameters for such radically curved shells were developed within the framework of the technology work for the JF-90.

New fabrication techniques are being investigated for the aluminum components. The drape forming of smooth surfaces to produce curved components which cannot be produced by rolling is one of the classic aircraft manufacturing procedures. This procedure is now being expanded to integrally reinforced panels which have been milled by digital control while in a flat state. One possible use is for the air intake duct, which is simultaneously the wall of the fuselage tank. The principal advantages are reduction of jointing costs and the disappearance of sealing problems.

The superplastic forming of aluminum or titanium sheets permits the cost-effective production of complex forms. One use is in the substructure for the rudder unit. Connected V-shaped spars with corrugated buckle-reinforcement of the webs can be manufactured very easily by the "blowing in" of a flat sheet into an approximately constructed closed form so that the entire substructure can be produced from only a few components. The covering of the rudder unit is made up of CFRP.

The described method of construction is advantageous for the all-moving rudder which was at first planned for the JF-90. For a fixed vertical fin with rudder and the resultant geometric requirements which are less suited to this method of construction, two alternatives are currently being investigated: using corrugated spars of aluminum-lithium made by superplastic forming, or by using integrally reinforced CFRP spars in a fabrication procedure.

#### Timely Establishment of Logistic Readiness

H. Wenzel, diplomate in physics and director of Product Support for Eurofighter, Ltd., explains what is involved in the simple words

"establishment of logistic readiness." During the definition phase alone the following documents were compiled:

- The technical-logistic weapons system specification;
- Master plan for the establishment of logistic readiness;
- Reliability program plan;
- Maintainability program plan;
- Plan for logistic support;
- Plan for the production of technical manuals and instructions;
- Plan for the training of flight and ground personnel as well for training materials and equipment;
- Plan for the testing and trouble-shooting concept together with a special integration document;
- Plan for flight and mission simulators;
- Plan regarding high-maintenance components; and
- Plan for ground servicing and testing equipment

In addition there are:

- Proposals for the demonstration of maintainability;
- Proposals of technical-logistic maintenance in the utilization phase, supplemented by:
- National Interfaces.

All these plans are documents which are continuously coordinated and adapted to the current state of development. Thus it is that the "Manual for the Establishment of Logistic Readiness"--that is, the "Logistic Readiness Plan"--comes about.

The weapons system support classification of technical-logistic weapons system specification primarily describes all weapons system performance characteristics in regard to ground operation. It becomes an integral part of the development contract. It specifies what performance characteristics are to be achieved in the area of logistics.

The master plan for the establishment of logistic readiness describes by which development and operational organizations and by means of which measures and

procedures the goals are to be achieved. In the process, integrate logistical analysis, the graduated establishment of logistic readiness, construction quality control and modification system, and life cycle cost analysis are particularly stressed.

The Product Support Directorate of Eurofighter Aircraft, Ltd., fulfills the requirement for equal priority of the logistic disciplines with technology, program control and economy. The product support director is responsible for maintenance and supply, on-going coordination with NEFMA (NATO European Fighter Management Agency), an appropriate integration into the development process, the coordination and integration of the work of the partner firms, and the coordination and integration of the subcontractors' preliminary work.

#### The Power Plant for the JF-90

The following data have been established for the EFA power plant: turbine intake temperature of 1,800 degrees Kelvin, afterburner temperature of 2,030 degrees Kelvin; bypass flow ratio 0.4; overall pressure ratio 25.6; air mass flow 74 kg/s; and engine bleed air 1.5 kg/s. The power plant has a diameter of 913 mm and weighs 1,030 kg. technical progress allows the use of so-called blisks--that is, a turbine disc and blades in one piece; the word is a neologism made up of blade and disc.

#### Radar Concept for the JF-90

A. Roy, diplomate in engineering at AEG, explained the radar concept for the JF-90. The radar is the primary active sensor of the Fighter Aircraft 90 and an integral part of the weapons system. As a sensor for air and ground targets as well as for weapons employment, its use is required over the entire spectrum of the flight profile and in all kinds of weather, even under heavy ECM [electronic countermeasure] measures and those to be developed in the future. Additional requirements are easy operability and a sufficient growth potential. Two types of medium-range missiles are planned for the Fighter 90: The semiactive missiles require continuous wave target illumination. From about 1990 on, AMRAAM will be the most important air-to-air missile of the Western World for the F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado ADV, Sea Harrier, F-47 Phantom, and finally the EFA weapons systems.

AMRAAM can be employed in four different ways, namely:

--In the independent mode, the active missile search head locks on to the target while the missile is still attached to the aircraft which is carrying it.

--In the inertial mode (extended short range), the missile is fed, prior to launching, the target coordinates and expected target heading by onboard radar. This operation mode can be used for targets which do not maneuver much. After going through the inertial phase, the search head becomes active and takes over the final approach.

--If the missile is to be fired over long distances, it must receive target parameters during its passive phase via data link.

--Multiple firing permits the launching and simultaneous guidance of several missiles.

Faced with the choice of either developing a new radar itself or undertaking the modification of an existing radar, AEG together with its partner firms decided on the adaptation of an operationally available radar--namely, that of the APG-65 by Hughes, which had already been selected for the combat effectiveness upgrading of the F-4F Phantom. Its vital data are: pulse-Doppler; high mean performance, low peak performance; plane antenna with extremely small side lobes; combined receiver/transmitter central frequency; programmable signal processor with high processing rate; data processor with solid-state memory and high data rate; software-controlled radar functions; a multiplicity of 14 air-to-air, 10 air-to-ground, and 2 test operating modes; and software and hardware operationally available. An unusual software savings results from the fact that the software required for AMRAAM will already be available with the combat effectiveness upgrading of the F-4F. In addition, this radar will already be in use in the early 1990's by the three NATO air forces of Spain, Canada and the Federal Republic, and by the U.S. Navy and Australia.

AEG calls the EFA radar MSD for multimode Silent Digital. In comparison with developing a new radar, it offers the least technical risk, no time problem, a cost-effective solution, and a good growth potential.

#### Onboard Computer for the JF-90/EFA

The LITEF Company's talk dealt with the topic of avionics/onboard computer for the JF-90/EFA. in the course of it, the centralized data processing put into effect in the Tornado was at first contrasted with EFA's decentralized data processing concept. It was explained that in contrast to the Tornado, in which the central computer, which was developed by LITEF, is connected radially with the other avionics equipment via individual interfaces, in the case of EFA a bus architecture will be required because of the extensive data communications. In this way, the avionics equipment will be connected to decentrally arranged computers via several standardized databuses. further, EFA's increase in complexity, higher processing speed and greater need for memory space in comparison with Tornado was pointed out.

In this regard, the MIL-STD-1533B bus, as well as a fiber optic bus suitable for greater data rates, was discussed. The current state of the ADA high-level language planned of the EFA program was also gone into.

The modular avionics computer (MAC), developed by LITEF within the framework of the JF-90 technology program, was specifically described in detail. The computer, designed as a multiprocessor system, permits parallel operation of several efficient processors. Processing speed and memory capacity have been adapted to the anticipated requirements for EFA. The computer has, among

other things, a MIL-STD-1553B interface with the possibility of conversion to fiber optics. Programming is done in ADA. Prototypes of this computer are already operating in laboratories at MBB [Messerschmit-Boelkow-Blohm] and Dornier.

In further talks SEL [Standard Elektrik Lorenz AG] dealt with the navigation concept, VDO [VDO Luftfahrtgeraete Werk] with the cockpit information system, and AEG with sunlight-readable color display technology and the helmet gunsight. Without question the forum in Munich was one of the highlights of the events sponsored by the German Society for Defense Technology in 1986.

There was talk of supersonic cruising speeds, and yet it has been a week and the lecture manuscripts forwarded from Munich have not yet arrived. And so the editors put the blame for the delay on the postal system and not (as officialdom does) on the local enterprises when deadlines are not met.

In the meantime work has proceeded. Tenders for the interim power plant have been submitted and the tenders for the onboard radar are due by 4 March. The beginning of the development phase, however, will be postponed beyond the parliamentary summer recess because the committees will hardly render their votes before October.

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## RESERVIST CADRES FORMING FOR 60-SERIES HOME DEFENSE BRIGADE

Bonn LOYAL in German Jun 87 pp 10-11

[Article by Lt Con Otto Heirich Fritzel: "An Attempt at Cooperation"]

[Text] Initial Situation

Army Structure 4 provided for the establishment of mobilization-dependent major formations in the form of home defense brigades in the 60-series. They were composed of units having a variety of assignments, manpower structures and levels of training. Some of them were newly established.

They were assigned to military district commands and commanded by a "responsible officer," whose main duties derived from the staff of the military district command. The mission of this officer was to implement mobilization preparations at all basic command levels. For this, he depended upon support by the general and special staff sections of the command. For all concerned, this meant a time-consuming additional workload which they had to undertake in addition to their normal duties.

Mobilization dependency required the assignment of active duty cadre personnel to act in key functions. Personnel required for this purpose came from schools, offices and central military assignments.

For the 63rd Home Defense Brigade this meant assignment of personnel from an army field service school. These officers and noncommissioned officers' primary duty involved training and their availability for mobilization-related duties was therefore very limited, if indeed they were available at all. The operational availability was therefore so limited that some changes had to be made. They consisted of relieving the field service school of this duty and transferring it to the General Army Office.

As a result of experience up to that point, an activity named "Cadre Personnel" had been established a few months earlier. Its mission was to implement all preparations for mobilization.

However, the capability of fulfilling this mission was limited by some deficiencies in the availability of personnel and material, but particularly in matters of jurisdiction. Nevertheless this solution was an improvement over

the preceding situation. In conjunction with the facts stated above, this led to the following.

#### Evaluation:

Lacking availability of active-duty leadership personnel required an assessment of whether these duties could be accomplished by reserve officers and/or noncommissioned officers, and if so, to what extent. As a result, active-duty cadre personnel assignments were reduced.

The criteria used in this assessment were proficiency, willingness and readiness to undergo further training, and, last but not least, willingness to assume responsibility.

Previous attempts to establish an effective group of leaders had shown mixed results. The reason for this were the facts described above. Particular emphasis must be placed on the remarkable relationship between mission, jurisdiction and responsibility, initially on the part of the "responsible officer" and later on the part of the cadre personnel.

Evaluation of the above factors with respect to the home defense brigade led to the following:

#### Decision

Effective immediately, the 63rd Home Defense Brigade will, mostly on its own initiative, try to arrive at a solution of the personnel problems affecting the command level. In accomplishing this, the brigade is prepared to take actions which either are unorthodox or give the impression of being so. It will organize its internal functions in a way which will provide solutions to tasks deriving from the main mission.

In this, the brigade depends upon support from its next higher command--which may consist merely of non-interference, if indicated. The intermediate term is to be considered as the time factor.

This decision triggered the following:

#### Actions

--All reserve officers assigned to the brigade received a letter which provided general information about the major formation and which also contained a proposal for advanced tactical group training. The interest shown in this proposal was to be used as a basis for planning.

--Jointly with the professional journal LOYAL a type of "help wanted" ad was published, advising reserve officers of all ranks--but especially lieutenants and captains--of the availability of mobilization assignments in the 63rd Home Defense Brigade. Anyone interested was offered a personal interview with the cadre personnel commander.

--Communication was established or intensified with the central personnel directorate, with district control selective service boards, with the neighboring

major formation (the 53rd Home Defense Brigade) and with the Association of German Bundeswehr Reservists (Land Group North Rhine-Westphalia and/or District Group Duesseldorf).

--Mobilization leadership position assignees were asked in writing to devote their energies to their additional duties.

--For advanced tactical training, a training schedule was established for use in the brigade as well as for the Bundeswehr Reservists' Association.

This group of actions brought an unexpectedly good response and the following:

#### Results

Brigade officers responded in great numbers and more than 70 percent indicated an interest in advanced tactical training.

An official meeting at a mobilization base, called for the purpose of discussing details, was well attended and resulted in a coordinated training plan for 1986, which was continued for 1987.

--As a result of the article in LOYAL, personal interviews were conducted with 25 reserve officers, most of them resulting in assignment requests to the central personnel directorate. In this connection, the following points were significant: 1. most of those interested were officers of the targeted group; 2. they were mainly officers willing to undergo training, but who had either no mobilization assignments or ones which they considered unsatisfactory.

--With the help of the central personnel directorate, most of the assignment requests were quickly processed as desired by the brigade and the individuals concerned and with a minimum of bureaucratic procedures.

--Generous support was obtained also from the neighboring major formation, especially in individual defensive exercises, and from the Reservists' Association, especially in organizing official activities.

--There were varied reactions on the part of the mobilization replacement officers; one of the particularly positive ones concerned the assignment of infantry training center instructors as battalion commanders.

--The workload of the cadre personnel in the preparation and execution of the official activities remained at justifiable levels comparable to that of the reserve staff officers of the military district commands, military region commands and the Reservists' Association. However, readiness must take precedence over "regular business hours," and the willingness to participate in evening or weekend operations. This applies particularly to cadre personnel.

--The scarcity of funds for postage and especially for travel to official activities constituted a great obstacle. In some instances, this shortage caused a lack of required information and/or led to cancellation of advanced training activities.

--The brigade's offer for qualifying advanced training to officers with or without assignment was well received. The activities were attended by 30 to 50 percent of those contacted and benefited from their eager participation.

--Regular meetings of some brigade reserve officers resulted in their getting to know each other and in the creation of a sense of belonging within the major formation. This factor is considered to be quite essential; we are justified in speaking of a catalyst here. The same is basically true for the official activities being conducted jointly with the Duesseldorf district group of the Reservists' Association. From all the above, we can derive the following:

#### Experience and Initiatives

--To attain a certain goal, some unorthodox means have been and must still be employed.

--"Mission tactics" must be practiced at all levels of command.

--Bureaucratic concerns and thinking must be approached in a critical manner.

--It is important to confront reserve officers with tasks capable of solution. For this purpose, advanced training leading to greater military proficiency is mandatory. In other words, their leadership ability and proficiency must be improved.

--The training leading to this must therefore provide them with the necessary tools. Practical field exercises must be the point of maximum emphasis, and at the same time the culmination of all training!

--Insofar as regulations permit, a wide distribution of training documentation is recommended. This would include also the temporary loan of service regulations!

--The official activities should take place at mobilization bases whenever possible, to give the reserve officers an opportunity to become familiar with this part of their task also, while at the same time enabling the company sergeant majors to present their varied and extensive range of responsibilities. The motto "The soldier must be conscious of his abilities" certainly applies to them also.

--Supervision and direction by the director of cadre personnel and his staff facilitates everyone getting to know everyone else, an appreciation of professional and human attributes and thereby the creation of a foundation of mutual trust, which is supported by the emergence of a sense of belonging.

--These meetings are also a forum for discussion of promotions and similar matters.

--The results of personal interviews as a basis for personnel assignment actions by the central personnel directorate have proven worthwhile; support received from that source has been exemplary.

--Reporting the names of reserve officers having undergone advanced training to the central personnel directorate leads to improved opportunities for promotion and greater motivation.

--Participation of superiors in such advanced training is carefully observed and considered an important indication of practical involvement.

--From time to time, LOYAL or the military journals should publish reports about these activities, because it is known that such articles are widely read and that they are liable to trigger a "snowball effect!"

The above described attempts to improve the quality and quantity of the officer corps should be viewed from the particular standpoint of the 63rd Home Defense Brigade. It is to be hoped that they will nevertheless be useful as a point of departure for creative thinking against a realistic background.

9273/12951

CSO: 3620/267

GREECE

MILITARY

BRIEFS

U.S. BASES' PARTISANS--Which members of the PASOK's Executive Bureau sided with the here and now signing of the agreement on the U.S. bases (and did so without any reservations) at the...historic (and please remember this!) meeting that took place on Monday? Alevras and Koutsogiorgas... (No comment!)

[Text] [Athens PONDIKI in Greek 10 Jul 87 p 4]

WAR MATERIEL EXPORTS--An Ilyushin-76 transport aircraft landed on the Tuesday before Easter at the Elefsina airport under very tight security and loaded war materiel. This was denounced by ND deputy I. Varvitsiotis, who made the interpellation yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies. He added that according to information in his possession, the sales of military ammunition by the Greek government to Iraq have markedly increased in recent months and that the loading is carried out at the Elefsina airport. Finally, Mr Varvitsiotis asked the government to inform the Chamber of Deputies about the identity of the countries to which Greece has sold military equipment since 1982 and what were the amounts involved, what kind of equipment was sold, and how the materiel is transported to the purchasing countries. Moreover, Mr Varvitsiotis also asked in his interpellation about the reasons for the landing of the Ilyushin-76 at the Elefsina airport on that Tuesday. [Text]

[Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 8 Jul 87 p 3]

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SWEDEN

MILITARY

## NAVY USED U.S. COMBATANTS AS LURE TO CATCH SUBMARINES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 May 87 p 6

[Article by Lena Soder and Bo Westmar]

[Text] Just before the large-scale submarine hunt in Hars Bay in the fall of 1982, the Navy had set a trap for foreign submarines in Kanholms Bay, according to an article in this week's NY TEKNIK.

When the two U.S. warships Montgomery and Belknap passed through Kanholms Bay on their way to Stockholm, they were being used, without knowing it, as the lures in the submarine trap.

The plans were kept secret, and not even the Submarine Commission received a report on the trap. Nor was anything written down--all the planning work was done orally.

According to NY TEKNIK, it is uncertain how much the commission learned about the trap. Sven Andersson, the commission's chairman, says he cannot recall everything that happened in Hars Bay.

The reason for setting the trap, according to NY TEKNIK, was that for several years the Navy had been receiving reports of suspected foreign submarines deep inside Swedish waters.

### Approved


The head of the Naval Staff's analysis group, Commander Emil Svensson, worked with Commander Anders Hammar to draw up a plan for making a major response. It was approved in July or August 1982 by the chiefs of the Defense Staff, the Coastal Fleet, the Stockholm Coast Artillery, and the 1st Helicopter Squadron in Berga.

By the middle of September, the trap was set. Practically every resource that could be mustered in the Eastern Naval Command took part in the operation. The passage of the two U.S. warships on 25 September provided a convenient lure, but it was not planned, according to what Anders Hammar told DAGENS EKO. He also confirmed that statement in NY TEKNIK.

On 1 October, the submarine alert sounded in Hars Bay, which is quite a distance south of Kanholms Bay. It was then concluded that the trap had been set at the right time but in the wrong place.

The Defense Staff ordered all units to proceed to Hars Bay. The unsuccessful hunt was called off after 3 weeks.

The only unit still in Kanholms Bay was a patrol boat, which reported indications of a docking between a mother ship and a minisub. But no major action was taken.



The Navy's trap had been set in Kanholms Bay. But the alert came from Hars Bay.

#### Right Time, but Wrong Place

Commander Emil Svensson told DAGENS NYHETER: "The information in NY TEKNIK is correct in broad outline." He claims, however, that the Submarine Commission was informed of the naval operations that took place in close association with the submarine hunt in Hars Bay.

"Naturally, we do not want the opponent to find out everything we do, so I had something to do with the fact that this operation did not come to light. The Submarine Commission knew about it, but the members were loyal enough not to mention it."

Emil Svensson says: "Kanholms Bay was one of the areas we considered to be of interest--an area that we ought to watch a little more closely.



"We could not put together a good-sized force--any more than we can today. But there were a few boats and some ground units."

#### "An Acknowledgement"

The force stayed there until the alert sounded in Hars Bay, when it was taken away from Kanholms Bay.

"When we got the indication in Hars Bay, it was an acknowledgement that at least something was going on, so we gathered our forces there."

The timing of the Swedish Navy's operation proved to be correct, but not the place.

"No, because we would have won right away if we had known ahead of time where a foreign submarine was going to turn up."

According to Emil Svensson, it was purely by chance that the Swedish operation coincided with a visit by the U.S. Navy.

"It is true that the big powers often shadow each other, but submarines are seldom used in that connection. A poor old submarine does not go very fast, of course, and it can't see very much, either."

The head of the Naval Staff's analysis group is reluctant to describe the operation in Kanholms Bay as a "submarine trap."

"I seldom use such exaggerations as 'barriers,' 'traps,' and 'hemmed in.' The simple reason is that it is difficult to set up 'barriers' and set 'traps' for submarines or to 'surround' them."

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CSO: 3650/148

## DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY FORECASTS INCREASING RURAL DEPOPULATION

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 May 87 p 8

[Article by Karin Henriksson and Emily von Sydow; first seven paragraphs are SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] The map of Sweden is being rearranged--more people are moving to already densely populated areas while thinly populated areas are losing inhabitants.

Stockholm is growing into a new superregion with 100,000 new inhabitants, with the expansion spreading northward in the direction of Uppsala.

In the northern part of the country people from the interior are moving toward the coast, to Umea, Skelleftea and Lulea.

In southern Sweden the old industrial city of Malmo seems to be reviving and acting as a new axis to attract migration toward Lund and Goteborg.

Linkoping and Malardalen will maintain their positions due to the university and proximity to Stockholm respectively.

The Bergslagen area and the southeastern end of the country are losing inhabitants, as has interior Norrland.

This leads to difficult political questions that involve regional policy and equality with regard to expansion and future industry. The government is trying to sit on both sides of the fence and the double message is confusing employers and local politicians.

#### Sweden Regrouping for the Future

The sound of hammering is no longer heard in many factories and shipyards. But not everyone mourns the demise of basic branches in industrial society; many people want to create jobs for the future in the service-oriented society. These jobs are found in and around university towns and are called knowledge-intensive.

There is a broad span between the visions of future optimists and the dire predictions of the pessimists. The Social Democratic government is caught between the export figures of growth enthusiasts and responsibility for geographic equality: a car factory in Malmo versus mining in Stekenjokk.

#### Millions Blocked

At the same time Industrial Affairs Minister Thage G. Peterson suffered a setback in Riksdag when his regional policy millions were held up by the nonsocialists and the Left-Communist Party [VPK]. The Riksdag majority wanted a clear answer to the question of how the money (1.9 billion kronor in all) will be spent.

"Geographic and social equality is one of the reasons for Sweden's favorable development," explained Anna Carin Berglund, one of the members of the Cabinet Office's future policy group.

Housing Minister Hans Gustafsson spoke at a seminar arranged by the Policy and Business Society on the paradoxes of the information society. The computer makes widespread decentralization possible, but it has contributed to a concentration of people in the expanding areas instead.

#### Pragmatic Outlook

"Growth is fine but we should be aware of what is involved. It should not occur at the expense of a Sweden made up of a handful of rapidly expanding areas surrounded by a dying landscape," Gustafsson said.

Some have an entirely pragmatic view. For example this is what Sven-Tore Holm of the development company behind the Ideon research park in Lund had to say:

"Each part of the country has had or will have its day. Iron ore, timber, the shipyards that dominated entire regions are out--now it is the university districts that are responsible for industrial innovation. And in a few decades something else will be dominant."

Can development be controlled? The Cabinet Office's future policy group thinks it can and says we cannot lean back and observe the violent expansion of the Stockholm region occur at the expense of thinly populated districts.

"We must get the good rhythms working in other places besides the knowledge-intensive university towns. The secret is to impart knowledge in as broad a form as possible," said Berglund.

#### New Role for Administration

"Relocation should not be carried out in the same way as the decentralization of organizations and administration was accomplished in the 1960's. The main idea then was to create new jobs. Instead one must make sure that

an administration has something to offer the local decision-making structure. A good example is the relocation of the Selective Service Agency to Karlstad where there was already a regiment."

It is harder to predict trends in the next few decades because there are fewer big industrial job sites with thousands of employees. The public sector now accounts for an element of continuity in this country. Hospitals, daycare institutions and social service centers are the same in practice whether an area is expanding or threatened with extinction.

The key words in all regional policy planning and forecasts of the future are education and communications. But there are divided opinions about how education should be structured. The future policy group wants regional folk high schools to be broad and comprehensive. It is unfortunate if they are geared exclusively for teacher training, for example. The existence of the school will then depend on how much demand there is for teachers in the future.

Others feel there is a risk that the regional high schools will dilute the universities. Spreading out resources weakens Sweden's competitiveness in the area of knowledge.

#### Several Branches

The future policy group feels specialization is a bad thing. Society has to have more than one leg to stand on. Look what happened to Bergslagen's one-sided factory society, Berglund said:

"It is not just that the factory was closed but that it left a mental mark on the inhabitants that is hard to break loose from," she explained.

Overtornea is cited as an example of a successful local community that has managed to handle its own resources and administer its expertise in bio-dynamic cultivation in the so-called ecoproject. The drain of experts has been halted. Some people have started to move back to the area.

Sometimes specialization is the only way to be number one and bring home an order. Statistician Erik Tangden points to Skelleftea which succeeded in landing an order for the interior decoration of Cologne's concert hall as a result of its persistent emphasis on woodworking industries.

#### Stockholm Draws Young People

The real problem with regional education, according to Tangden, is that it is not adapted to the local economy:

"Instead local planners reason that it is better for young people to get a good education because they will end up going to Stockholm and getting jobs anyway. Thinly populated areas are being drained of young people who come to Stockholm and knock out the less well-educated young people there. That

is the immigration pattern we have seen in recent years and it has been hard on young people in Stockholm," said Tangden.

Göte Bernhardsson, county employment director in Malmö, is critical of schools that have been unable to meet industrial needs for skilled workers or the hospital and social service sector's need for personnel. He is especially concerned about the many young women who have specialized in marketing and clerical work. According to him they have no training at all and their chances of succeeding on the job market are minimal.

#### Women's Problems

Västernorrland governor Sven Johansson thinks that one of the reasons why the thinly populated districts are losing more people is the problems faced by young women:

"We must get work for the girls. They are the ones who leave first and when there are no girls, the boys won't stay either."

The other key word is communications. In Norrland this is largely a question of quick flights to Stockholm, preferably at rates as low as those charged for the same distances in the south, Västernorrland governor Sven Johansson pointed out.

"I do not understand why it costs 75 kronor more to fly to Umeå from Arlanda than it does to fly to Ängelholm. The distance is the same."

In Malmö communications involves connecting Sweden to the continent via the Öresund bridge. The Danish Öresund committee will issue a report this summer. No decisions can be expected before then.

#### Demographic Trends

The number of Swedes will increase to 8.5 million by the end of the century and then decline until 2025, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. Other estimates indicate that the Stockholm region will have 100,000 new inhabitants from this date up to the year 2000.

There are more jobs but the increase is unevenly distributed across the country. Development is weakest in typical industrial regions, according to the National Industrial Board [SIND], which also noted that industrial towns are losing inhabitants in record numbers while towns in thinly populated areas show a small immigration surplus.

It is worst for women, SIND points out. Where unemployment is high for men it is at least equally high for women who also often work in depressed sectors.

Stockholm is the biggest city in Sweden, Göteborg is the nation's second largest city and Malmö is the third largest. That is what the geography

books say and it is still true. At the end of March 1987, 11 cities in the country had more than 100,000 inhabitants:

Stockholm has 664,211 inhabitants, Goteborg 430,351, Malmo 230,439, Uppsala 158,079, Norrkoping 118,847, Orebro 118,652, Linkoping 118,013, Vasteras 117,717, Jonkoping 108,406, Helsingborg 106,530 and Boras 100,090.

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